Brian M Downing
Last week Vladimir Putin executed bold moves in the Eastern Ukraine – a part of the country that may soon be an autonomous region, an independent country, or part of Russia (again). There can be little doubt as to who would be the first to recognize it as such. Russia announced maneuvers around the Ukraine and its forces have flown into Crimean bases. Troops of uncertain origin and intent have taken positions around strategic points including the Crimean parliament. The Russian Duma, an acquiescent if not dormant institution, has voiced its support for Russian intervention in the Ukraine.
The West has seen the Ukrainian crisis as primarily a trade issue between the EU and the Russian sphere, or as a political struggle between reformers and a corrupt political-business elite. Hence, the West was largely surprised by Putin’s move. (My post of last week predicted it.)
Putin views the situation to his south quite differently. From the perspective of a man steeped in Russian political culture and trained in national security interests, events in the Ukraine threaten Russian military facilities in the Crimea and foreign policy interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East that rely on those bases.
Gradualism and assessment
Putin has opted for a gradual use of troops and maneuvering that gives him the opportunity to assess critical responses both in and out of the Ukraine before proceeding.
Local support: Ethnic Russians and Ukrainians who favor close ties with Russia are demonstrating and organizing self-defense forces. The extent of Russian orchestration is unknown but it almost certainly is there. The same may be said of Russia’s willingness to arm them.
Local opposition: Opposition to separatism in the Eastern Ukraine under Moscow’s aegis exists among ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. Each group has had catastrophic experiences under Russian rule. Stalin ruthlessly expropriated Ukrainian grain in order to finance rapid industrialization, causing several million to starve to death. Crimean Tatars were deemed security threats during World War Two and forcibly relocated a thousand miles to the north and east from which they are still returning. If Ukrainians and Tatars are willing to resist separatism in the east, Putin may be facing protracted turmoil or even fighting. This prospect may confine his objectives to controlling the Crimean peninsula which holds the Russian naval bases.
The Ukrainian army: The national army is a compact force of approximately 74,000 troops, about forty percent of which are conscripts serving one-year terms. Conscription guarantees the presence of the same divisions in the country as a whole. Short terms of service indicate a dearth of well-trained troops but a large number of young people with at least some experience with firearms and unit discipline.
Dispositions of senior officers and battalion commanders are unknown. The government would have an interest in seeing ethnic Ukrainians prevail in the upper officer corps but that would have to be balanced by the need to include ethnic Russians. Kiev and Moscow have almost certainly been assessing the officer corps’ reliability for several weeks now, if not for several years. In the events of being ordered to move against eastern separatists, the army may be rent by infighting, organizational sabotage, and mutiny which would render it of limited use against eastern militias and of no use against Russian troops.
International reactions: Putin’s gradual moves allow for the EU, the US, and others to formulate a response. Sanctions will have little short-term effect. The US is unlikely to respond forcefully, even though the Ukraine has sent small detachments to serve with American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq – and did so for help against Russia one day. Washington’s attention is elsewhere – in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and East Asia. Further, Washington is mindful that key supply routes to Afghanistan wind through Russia and Russian-influenced countries such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Greater antagonism with Putin could be calamitous. The US and Britain, however, may respond by increasing support for Syrian rebels battling Russia’s ally in Damascus.
The Ukraine’s remoteness, proximity to Russia, and limited strategic usefulness call into question NATO’s reliability in defending other countries formerly in the Russian sphere but now in the western defense alliance. Such countries will be seeking assurances from NATO.
Sympathetic movements: Russian help in detaching the eastern Ukraine is being watched in the Muslim parts of the Russian Caucasus. The people of Chechnya and Dagestan will reason that if Russia helps Ukrainians secede, why shouldn’t they be able to secede as well. They will not expect consistency from Moscow here, but at least some elements will begin to return to insurgency and bombing campaigns.
Domestic politics
How will Russians see their president’s actions to the south? Power prestige has been a source of legitimacy for leaders as far back as the warrior-kings of Antiquity. In our own times, leaders who win wars also garner a great deal of popular acclaim. Many Russians look back on their nation’s past and see Alexander Nevsky, Peter the Great, and Joseph Stalin as great men who defended the country and vanquished encroaching foes. Putin would like to see his name spoken reverently along with them.
Many Russians, especially younger ones, see the moves in the Ukraine as the acts of an autocrat who will use his power prestige to fend off demands for reform. Fighting in the Ukraine may trigger sympathetic demonstrations in Russian cities – the Russian Spring often thought to be building.
Western sanctions, as noted, will not have any short-term effect on Russian policy. If protracted, though, sanctions may weaken an already less-than-thriving economy leading to greater despair and emigration. This may prove to be more burdensome than a western-leaning Ukraine to whoever is then in power.
Copyright 2014 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs