Putin pulls back in Syria
Brian M Downing
As unexpectedly as it sent forces into Syria last fall, Russia is now withdrawing them – or least it has begun to. Monday’s announcement referred to the “main part” being pulled out. What has the short-lived deployment accomplished? What lies ahead for Russia, Syria, and the region.
Why leave?
The Russian mission did not seek to help reconquer Syria from rebel groups. Nor was it designed to deliver a decisive defeat on them, 
though the battle of Aleppo still looms. The objective was to stabilize faltering government positions and impress upon rebel forces, and their foreign backers, that Russia would stand by the Syrian government. (See my “Putin strengthens his position in Syria.”)
Putin will likely pivot from determination and strength to accommodation and diplomacy. He is well positioned to exert great pressure on both Syria and Iran to accept realities in the Levant and go ahead with serious negotiations. Without Russia, they will fritter away scarce resources in an endless war with richer Sunni powers.
Putin may emerge from the brief intervention as a winner, mostly at home but to some extent in the world. His costs have been limited, though there are reports that a terrorist bomb killed several Russian generals in Damascus last month. Undoubtedly, Russian media will note that Russian might brought ISIL’s onslaught to a standstill, though of course it halted over a year before the Russian effort began. He will also have elided the temptation to deepen his commitment – what in the IS is called “mission creep,” what his generals likely call “another Afghanistan.”
Who loses: Syria and Iran
Damascus and Tehran will be disaffected by Russia’s withdrawal, however partial it may prove to be. Neither has any powerful alternative, though. Elements in each country had visions of reconquering eastern Syria and perhaps even western Iraq, thereby securing lines of communication from Tehran to the Mediterranean. Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon would form a powerful bloc opposed to Sunni powers.
Instead, the Shia arc is broken, probably for decades. The lawless regions of eastern Syria and western Iraq will be fiercely contested. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf principalities will try to turn the region into a stable, obliging Sunni-stan. Shia powers will prefer to see it volatile, anarchic, and perhaps one day open to reconquest.
Who loses: the rebel factions
The rebels may lose, too. Initially, it might be suspected that Putin’s withdrawal will lead to weakened Shia forces and an opening for a decisive rebel offensive. But Russia is eminently capable of redeploying its fighter aircraft to the Latakia field and once again demonstrating support for Damascus. The flight from the Crimea or the northern Caspian Sea is short.
Various warlords, tribal chieftains, would-be emirs, and Islamist visionaries are likely to return to fighting each other at least if not more viciously than they fight government forces.
Israel will prefer to see volatility and anarchy than a stable Sunni-stan beholden to Sunni Arabs. For all the coziness with Israel just now, the Sunni princes are in the long run more dangerous to Israel than the Shias are. If one cannot have peaceful neighbors, better to have weak fragmented ones.
Rapprochement with the Sunnis
Putin will purse a policy of restoring relations with the Sunni princes. Not long ago, the latter were angered by America’s Iran policy and 
meddlesome calls for democracy. They were signaling Washington their disgust – and buying military hardware from Moscow.
It made little sense for Russia to alienate the much larger and vastly wealthier Sunni states in favor of their sectarian foes. (See “Is Putin’s tilt to Shia states long-term?“) A peace conference on Syria may constitute the beginning of the rapprochement. China, as eager as anyone to weaken American standing in the world, may prove helpful.
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Putin is not out of the Syrian quagmire yet. But he is positioned to limit and even reduce his commitment there, and shift from aggressor to negotiator. If successful he will increase his standing in the world, at very little cost. He will also be better positioned to deal with his chief rival – NATO.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.