The recent nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 brings hope for political reform in Iran. This is especially so among the middle classes of Tehran and other urban areas. The impending end to sanctions by much of the world, they believe, will bring greater prosperity and an easing of the mullahs’ austere rule. Nonetheless, suspicion of and opposition to liberalization is entrenched in parts of religious and military institutions. There are, however, compelling reasons for Iran to liberalize.
Progressive hopes
Many Iranians and Americans hope that the election of Hassan Rouhani to the presidency in 2013 signaled an end to the highly controlled elections that brought Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power for eight years. With the nuclear deal and a reopening with the world, especially with the US, he will work with the Greens and place Iran on a track of democracy – the aspiration of many Iranians for almost a century now.
Many mullahs hold that democracy is not only compatible with the Koran, but called for by it. The principle of representative government inheres in the idea of the shura which is clearly established in sacred texts. Some claim, if fancifully and without due consideration for ancient Athens, that representative government began with Islam.
The more-practically minded believe that a vibrant and heterogeneous population such as Iran’s cannot be adequately governed by an autocrat – shah or clergyman. Iran must allow its various social strata and ethnic groups to have their say, lest government become hidebound and out of touch, and the populace disenchanted and mistrustful.
Conservative fears
The notion that democracy leads to deviance and self-indulgence is firmly planted in parts of the clergy. Their interpretation of the Arab Spring sees greater openness leading to turmoil and secession, greater willingness to denounce the state and its ruling elite, and an unmanageable range of demands. At the very least, the shift to democracy should be slow and cautious – and controlled by them.
Generals add that Iran is in great peril. ISIL forces are just to the west and are being held back chiefly by Shia militias that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has assembled. Saudi Arabia is gathering the Sunni monarchies of the Gulf under its wing in an effort to weaken Iranian influence if not subjugate the Shia nation. Riyadh has already placed Egypt in its camp and is seeking to establish Sunni governments in shattered parts of Syria and Iraq.
Iran is beset by insurgencies. The Kurds in the northwest see their kinsmen in Iraq and Syria breaking free and hope to do the same. Balochs in the southeast are also waging a low-level insurgency. Both insurgencies enjoy support from foreign powers: the Kurds from Israel, the Balochs from Saudi Arabia.
Conservatives look upon these dangers and see liberalization as folly. The nation, they hold, requires a stronger state and greater military power. Popular dissent is to be held in check, not acceded to.
Rapprochement with the US
Better relations with Washington will reduce the likelihood of attacks from Saudi Arabia or Israel. The US will press both powers to hold back as it tries to align with Iran to fight ISIL in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia and Israel are independent-minded and have little in common save for a loathing of Iran. Neither, however, can risk alienating the US with a full attack on, say, the Natanz and Fordo enrichment facilities. The national peril that Iranian conservatives use to argue against reform, then, will remain in place, but in less compelling forms.
In the US, rapprochement is driven by the White House and parts of the state. It has few constituents aside from substantial parts of the Iranian emigré community. Opposition to rapprochement, on the other hand, has sizable support from pro-Israel groups, both Jewish and Christian, which are positioned to argue for keeping sanctions and pressures on. They prefer to see Iran remain authoritarian to justify continued opposition. Movements toward reform will be derided as façades, and clandestine programs will be encouraged.
Paradoxically, Iranian conservatives also want reform to fail and they too are positioned to thwart rapprochement. Revolutionary Guards can create incidents in the Persian Gulf. It might be better said they can continue to create them; such incidents have occurred almost routinely over the months leading up to the nuclear agreement. Alternately, the Guards can crack down on dissidents and arrest foreign visitors at auspicious times.
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Opponents of democracy are well entrenched and foreign pressures are likely to persist. Political change may be limited to fairer presidential elections and an increasingly vocal parliament. Candidates will continue to be screened by the guardians, and the Supreme Leader will continue to have the final word. Today’s power structure will keep its authority by judicious disbursements of increased oil revenue.
Conservative mullahs may have cause to worry about their partner in government – the Revolutionary Guards. They have increased their prestige in the country through military exploits in Syria and Iraq which have enjoyed widespread coverage in national media. The Guards may be seen by many Iranians, urban modernizers and rural traditionalists, as valorous defenders of the Shia people from Lebanon to the homeland. The mullahs may be facing a military elite which wants to predominate in both economy and state. Accordingly, they may seek popular support against the generals.
A democratizing Iran would have a powerfully destabilizing effect on enemies in the Gulf. The Sunni princes have formed a concert system dedicated to upholding autocracy in the region. If their subjects were to see their putative enemy enacting reform, they would as why they cannot have the same freedoms. Indeed, they will likely demand them.
©2015 Brian M Downing