Brian M Downing
President Trump, like many people, is frustrated by the lack of progress in Afghanistan. This comes only a year after he sent in more GIs. Since then, the Taliban have continued to expand their presence in rural districts and recently struck a large city, Ghazni, a hundred miles southwest of Kabul.
The bulk of the Afghan National Army (ANA) is not up to retaking a lost district or city. That task falls upon special forces, who rely heavily on air support. These small elite units have suffered high casualties and are stretched thin. American troops are used in emergencies and may have to take up more of the burden.
Privatization of the war is under consideration. It isn’t on the horizon yet, but a principal advocate, Erik Prince, has organized private military units in the Gulf and is well connected to the administration. Privatization’s benefits of greater efficiency and lower costs have become a veritable creed in parts of Washington. The US military’s food services, transportation, communications, and intelligence have already been considerably privatized.
What benefits might privatization bring? Can it turn the tide? What risks are there?
Training
American businesses have been involved in training missions for many years, especially in the Middle East. The Vinnell Corporation, located in N Virginia, has been training Saudi military personnel for decades. DynCorp, just down the road from Vinnell, has been charged for many years with training the ANA and security forces.
Vinnell and DynCorp cadres, most of whom are US veterans, are good at teaching raw recruits how to march, salute, bark out cadences, and shoot reasonably well. Reams of statistics and miles of video demonstrate this.
Nonetheless, the training missions have not produced effective armies. The Saudis did not perform well in the First Gulf War. They refrain from fighting in Yemen. Having failed to convince Egypt and Pakistan to send combat troops, the Saudis keep their own forces in the rear and leave the fighting to others. The ANA is more willing to engage but the bulk of it is ineffectual.
Failings cannot be laid entirely at the feet of private training missions. The Saudi and Afghan armies are plagued by nepotism in the officer corps and ethnic/tribal tensions in the enlisted ranks. Nothing can change this.
Reaction forces
ANA special forces have performed well in recent years, pushing the Taliban out of Kunduz and blunting similar attacks. They are nearing exhaustion. Should they break, most of the south would fall and Kabul would be closer to encirclement. The US is already shifting US special forces and regular army units from training missions to ground combat. They may have to become permanent reaction forces, if not more.
An alternative is to send in a similar number of private military troops to counter Taliban thrusts and shore up weak positions. The private forces will be composed of American and British veterans but they do not have the experience of months of training and billeting together that military units have – essential to unit cohesion and effectiveness. Private forces would presumably be better paid than GIs and Tommies, so cost effectiveness isn’t likely.
There’s no reason to think a brigade from Blackwater or the like would be more effective than one from Ft Bragg or Camp Lejeune. Private forces would be less disciplined than army and marine units and hence more likely to worsen the image of Americans and fuel the insurgency.
Airpower
It would take years to produce even a small number of squadrons capable of tactical air support in Afghanistan. There’s no reason to believe they would be more effective than active duty units. Nor is there reason to think their operations would lead to fewer civilian deaths, which the Taliban benefit from. Supervision and repercussions will be greater in military units.
Private air forces might be presented as a solution to pilot shortages. Many pilots are tired of long deployments into inhospitable countries and are opting for careers in the high-paying airline industry. This is a false hope. The demand for experienced combat pilots would draw off from active-duty personnel, worsening pilot shortages.
Logistics
ANA outposts often fall to the Taliban because garrisons are not adequately supplied. Incompetence and corruption in the supply chain allow the enemy to win almost costless victories. The same troubles hurt the Iraqi army until US troops took over supply. Only then were Iraqi troops able to retake Ramadi, Fallujah, Tikrit, and Mosul from ISIL.
Americanization or privatization of ANA logistics would help morale and effectiveness. Troops will be more willing to fight if they don’t worry about running out of ammo and rations. However, Americans, GIs or civilians, would be exposed to Taliban ambushes along supply roads, requiring more troops to establish security.
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Privatization would have no effect on root causes of the insurgency. The Kabul government would remain corrupt and inept. The Taliban would continue to get support from Pakistan, Iran, and Russia. And Afghans would continue to see a large-scale foreign presence in their lives.
Private military operations may be no less vulnerable to mission creep than those conducted by regular armies. American contractors may find themselves deeply involved with Kabul officialdom and intrigues and with the operations and aspirations of foreign corporations that own the country’s mineral wealth. Contractors may benefit from such arrangements, American security interests may not.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.