President Trump faces the war in Afghanistan
Brian M Downing
Throughout the presidential campaign Donald Trump proclaimed that he would see that America won again. Early in his presidency he will have to deal with the resurgent Taliban which as winter ends, will be beginning a new offensive.
His national security team, though presently incomplete, indicates a hawkish approach. Part of making America great again will be through military accomplishments. Historically, such accomplishments have figured more highly than domestic ones in establishing national greatness and respected leadership. The Taliban will soon present an important challenge, and opportunity, for President Trump.
Afghanistan in early 2017
In the 2016 fighting season, the Taliban took control of several districts in the south, east, and north. Assaults on provincial capitals Kunduz and Lashkar Gah brought only temporary gains. Taliban forces were driven out, though not decisively defeated, by Afghan special forces and American airpower.
The Taliban will use the winter to rest, build up supplies, and prepare for renewed fighting in the spring. They are thought to be building special forces units of their own for efforts to take and hold key positions. Their casualties over the few fighting seasons are unknown but are likely quite high as they have been attacking fixed ANA positions and enduring heavy airstrikes.
The ANA’s casualties are not known either, but they too likely have been high. Losses have been compounded by desertions, ghost soldiers in many units, and occasional surrenders of poorly-supplied positions. The ANA, especially its overworked special forces, are stretched thin.
The Afghan government
The new president may face a rapidly deteriorating situation next summer. One option, which can be undertaken before the fighting season begins, is to pressure the Kabul government to end or greatly reduce its corruption and incompetence.
The Taliban resurgence of the last fifteen years has been helped by popular mistrust of the government. Local officials are often appointed for political loyalty rather than administrative skill, and once ensconced, they grab with both fists. Many Afghans consider the Taliban more honest. As Bernard Fall noted long ago, a government losing an insurgency isn’t being outfought, it’s being outgoverned.
Pressure for reform will bring many promises but few results. Corruption is firmly embedded in Afghanistan’s social and political life. Decades of almost constant war have turned most politicians and elders into grasping opportunists, interested mainly in gathering assets while they can.
Withdrawal from the south and east
The Taliban are a Pashtun movement. Their support outside the Pashtun regions of the south and Kunduz in the north, is limited. In Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, and Turkmen areas the Taliban are deemed austere and oppressive – the latest example of Pashtun misrule.
Withdrawing from the south, and concentrating on the comparatively friendly north, will lead to stronger military positions, better chances for economic development, and perhaps even a more coherent polity.1
Withdrawal, however, is inconsistent with the administration’s goal of restoring America’s prestige and respect in the world. In coming years, though, the Taliban may take so much of the south that Washington and Kabul will be forced to concentrate in the north.
Pakistan
The Taliban have reestablished themselves with the help of the Pakistani army, which sees them as allies against India, rewarding them with arms and safe havens. The significance of this relationship dawned only late on the US intelligence community.
This approach has potential. The Islamist militancy that the Pakistani army has long encouraged is now destabilizing the country with bombings and insurgencies. Further, it is limiting promising economic and military ties with China, which is likely also pressing the Pakistani generals to break with extremism.
US military action
The Trump administration’s ambition of bolstering American power in the world will not be advanced by withdrawal from the south or by diplomacy with Pakistan. Military action will. The situation in Afghanistan next spring may call for it, perhaps urgently.
The Taliban have developed from shadowy guerrillas who fight and run, to a more or less conventional force that has logistical backing and attacks in numbers to seize objectives. This makes them vulnerable to relatively small numbers of US ground forces in two respects.
First, massed troops can be attacked by airmobile American troops who will seal off escape routes and engage the massed Taliban fighters in regular ground fighting. They will be no match for American troops, not in unit cohesion or in firepower.
Second, the Taliban rely on supply caches and training bases in rear areas in the south and around Kunduz. ANA troops are overstretched and using them for deep strikes presents risks. American troops have demonstrated skill in such operations against ISIL in Syria and Iraq. The Taliban will have to withdraw thousands of fighters from targeted provinces and cities in order to protect once safe districts.
Such strikes may alter the calculus in the war. The Taliban will have to rethink prospects of taking large amounts of territory and of positioning itself for a strong position in peace talks. They will be mired again in a long war of attrition against a foe now bolstered by elite American forces. The US will not emerge victorious, only closer to an imperfect settlement.
1 See my “Plan B for Afghanistan” Asia Times. July 29, 2010.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.