Brian M DowningÂ
The four armed groups warring in Iraq – Islamic State (IS), the Kurdish peshmerga, the Iraqi army, and Sunni tribal levies – have strengths and weaknesses. They also have varying levels of foreign support and capacities for cooperation. IS troops have a marked qualitative edge but are badly outnumbered and have no reliable allies inside Iraq.
IS stands little chance of holding on to the swathes of Iraq it has recently conquered, and in coming months it will be forced to retreat from northern Iraq, if not from much of the country. The Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi’ites are capable of effectively countering IS’s offensive but political bargaining with the new Baghdad government will come first. The negotiations and fighting will determine Iraq’s future as a unified state, a federation, or a fragmented state.
The armies
IS forces have the best discipline and tactical expertise of any force in the country. Its rank and file trust their commanders, have more combat experience than rivals, and have demonstrated remarkable cohesion, tactical knowledge, and audacity. However, they are few in number – no more than 18,000 at most in Syria and Iraq. Since sweeping into northern Iraq last June they’ve become greatly overextended and must now fight on a winding 800-mile front along which they enjoy little support from local populations. Indeed, IS has alienated almost all those under its rule and is vulnerable to insurgency. The jihadi band has no defense against US airpower.
The Iraqi army has 90,000 combat troops organized into 180 battalions, each of differing competence. They cannot all be judged by the poor showing around Mosul last June. Those units comprised many Kurdish and Sunni Arab soldiers who were not inclined to fight for the Shi’ite government in Baghdad and in fact were pleased to see the Shi’ites abandon Sunni regions. Nonetheless, the national army’s officer corps is plagued by corruption and inexperience. Having regrouped in more Shi’ite regions, the army enjoys considerable local support and is being augmented by Shi’ite militias, adding to numerical strength though not to organizational ability and combat effectiveness.
Kurdish units boast some 200,000 troops, but training and equipment vary. Organization is poor and experience is low, but on the rise. Concerned foreign states are delivering arms to the beleaguered people and Kurds from Turkey and Iran are streaming to the aid of their cousins in both Syria and Iraq. The Kurds have recovered from earlier losses to IS and retaken many villages and strategic sites. Owing to limited training and political caution, peshmerga operations are not likely to extend too far from Kurdistan and parts of northern Iraq they recently seized.
Sunni tribal militias are of uncertain numbers; they are essentially levies that elders raise from a large pool of young men. Some fought in the insurgency against the US and in the Sunni Awakening against al Qaeda. Others are inexperienced youths in tribal patronage networks. They enjoy support from the population and know the terrain in both urban and rural settings. Tribal militias are likely to benefit from American arms and money, as they did in the Sunni Awakening. They have not exhibited great discipline or tactical mastery, neither in large or small units. US troops likened them to well armed street gangs. But they can harass IS troops across central and western Iraq and force the jihadis to reduce the number of troops deployed against the Iraqi army and Kurds.
IS’s discipline and experience gives it a considerable qualitative edge over the other armies in Iraq. However, the same could be said of the Third Reich’s military in the Second World War. The Reich, of course, was ground down and destroyed by numerically superior enemies. IS is incurring constant losses in skirmishes and from US airpower. It can no longer mass troops, hold fixed positions, deploy armor, or convoy men and equipment as tactical situations require.
With even moderately vigorous attacks from the three Iraqi enemies, IS will be badly attritted, with little chance that fresh recruits will compensate for constant losses of experienced fighters. The jihadi cult will either adhere to its warrior creed and fight on, which will lead to exhaustion and disintegration, or it will soberly accept the disadvantage and retreat to urban redoubts and the wastelands of western Iraq from which it can only wage a bombing campaign. In either case, it will no longer be the danger it is presently seen as.
The politics
Numerical advantages will not lead to an immediate IS defeat. The timing, vigor, and coordination of the counteroffensive depend on negotiations among the three groups. Unfortunately, there is considerable mistrust between the three and a coordinated campaign against IS will prove difficult. After all, one group is the former oppressor, the others the oppressed.
Wars have often brought unity, however sometimes they bring opportunity for aggrieved peoples to negotiate their rights and even their independence. Indian troops fought for the British Empire in Italy and Burma (now called Myanmar), but only with the understanding that cooperation would bring independence. The same can be said for African troops and the French Empire. The Kurds and Sunnis are thinking along the same lines and will ask for or declare autonomy. The Shi’ites want to keep both groups under the present unitary state and are seeking to control the flow of arms and money to the two groups.
The Kurds already have their own army, constitution, flag, and oil pipeline. They would like to declare independence. However, they face difficulties selling their oil overseas as Baghdad’s legal claims over it are widely respected. Kurdistan has only found buyers in Israel, Hungary, and an undetermined Southeast Asian country. (A tanker filled with Kurdish crude is sitting in international waters off Texas until the dispute is resolved.) The Kurds will seek to get Baghdad to relent on its claims, or convince foreign countries to recognize their legal claims in light of their contribution in fighting and defeating IS.
The Sunnis long dominated the Iraqi army and state until Saddam was driven from power in 2003. Irritated by Shi’ite preeminence, and recognizing their own small percentage of the population (about 16%), the Sunnis are the only Iraqi group that IS can find support from. IS’s bombing campaign against Shi’ite targets was at least tacitly supported by some Sunnis, especially remnants of Saddam’s army and state. IS’s recent offensive has been helped by those same remnants. They were instrumental in convincing parts of the Iraqi army to abandon Mosul, and IS rewarded them with positions in new local governments.
However, Sunni ambitions for autonomy are irreconcilable with IS’s dream of a new caliphate. The Sunnis, especially the tribes, are amenable to fighting IS. The most powerful sheikh, Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, has announced his willingness to fight IS. There will be a price and it seems to include direct US support, without Baghdad’s mediation – a step toward a fuller break from the old Iraq.
Neither Kurdish nor Shi’ite troops will be welcome in Sunni regions, hence the Sunni tribes will be decisive in ousting IS. The jihadis occupy large parts of Sunni territory, hence the Sunni tribes will be subject to pitiless reprisals. The Sunnis are unlikely to find minority status and a few portfolios preferable to the regional autonomy the Kurds already have. The Sunnis, armed by the West and victorious over the jihadis, will not again submit to the Shi’ite majority.
It is unclear if the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi’ites can agree upon Iraq’s future then attack IS in a concerted manner. While from a military perspective coordination would be preferable, it isn’t necessary to begin wearing IS down and forcing significant retreats. Each of the three forces has an incentive to stake out territory from the other two and demonstrate effectiveness to foreign powers in order to win support for its particular vision of Iraq’s future.
Brian M Downing is a political-military analyst, author of The Military Revolution and Political Change, The Paths of Glory: Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam, and co-author with Danny Rittman of The Samson Heuristic. He can be reached at brianmdowning@gmail.com.
(Copyright 2014 Brian M Downing)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MID-01-110914.html