Brian M Downing
The American war
The Taliban’s harboring of al Qaeda of course led to the US intervention in 2001. The campaign to expel the Taliban and AQ went remarkably well but subsequent efforts to stabilize and unify the nation failed. The Taliban reconstituted itself and AQ found refuge in eastern Afghanistan – both with Pakistan’s help.
A government was elected, a new day was dawning. But unfortunately Kabul did not try to reestablish the political equilibrium of older regimes which was lost in the communist reform effort of the late seventies and the long ensuing wars. Instead, President Karzai tried to build a centralized state with beholden officials in every province and district – a rhyme with the modernizing effort of the communists.
The state-building effort may have stemmed from political development models floating about academe and Washington, or from the assessment that only a strong state could control jihadism. More likely it came from schemes for personal power and a loyal machine floating about Hamid Karzai’s mind.
The government over the last twenty years has been corrupt and inept – from the highest officials in Kabul to provincial and district honchos. They bicker over aid programs and subsidies, though winning villages see only meager results. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) routinely reports scores of uncompleted projects and missing funds. So damning are the reports that they could be mistaken for intemperate critics from an antiwar outfit, but SIGAR is a Pentagon bureau.
Political equilibrium has been replaced by a mistrusted and even despised centralizing state and “amoral tribalism”. Tribal chiefs and village elders fiercely compete with one another for land, water, machinery, and money – the largesse of Washington coffers via Kabul bureaus. Neighboring chiefs and villagers are not so much fellow Afghans as they are dishonorable, hateful rivals.
Taliban insurgents have expanded their control, partly through rough conquest and partly through more trustworthy rule. Bernard Fall’s axiom: a regime losing an insurgency isn’t being out-fought, it’s being out-governed.
The Taliban have benefited from the Pakistani military (ISI) for almost thirty years. The generals view them as a formidable ally against India and as a means of securing trade routes with the ‘Stans. Pakistan sends money and arms and provides havens, all the while receiving aid from Washington coffers. More recently Russia and Iran have given arms and money to the Taliban.
Implications
Afghanistan is a broken country. There is no equilibrium between Kabul and the localities, only deep social antagonisms, widespread warfare, and more foreign intervention, though with new flags and currencies.
The US cannot restore equilibrium. It’s too closely associated with Kabul and collateral damage over the years. There’s nothing further to do except hand over responsibility to China, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan. With instability and jihadism so close, it’s truly an offer they can’t refuse.
Of the four, China has invested the most money and is the wealthiest by far. It wants the mines and oil fields to add to national greatness. Beijing might seek to re-establish the equilibrium between Kabul and localities by diverting some profits to Kabul to win back acceptance that Afghan kings once had. Greater stability would make exploitation easier.
Restoring equilibrium isn’t likely. Mistrust between the localities and Kabul is entrenched, as it is between localities, tribes, clans, and valleys. China’s payments to politicians in Kabul, at least much of it, would stain the capital or be deposited into foreign banks accounts. Beijing might opt to secure resources and extortion routes and leave the rest of the country to remain Hobbesistan.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.