Brian M Downing
Two decades have passed since the 9/11 attacks. Two decades of wars, expenditures, casualties, and failures. As US troops left Afghanistan last month President Biden pointed out that we’d killed Osama bin Laden but that hardly addressed the entirety of the operations.
In another twenty years assessments of the US response might be different, but for now it certainly seems to have been based on poor, dubious, and manipulated intelligence. Policies were poorly thought out from the start and inadequately scrutinized afterwards for problems.
The blunders were so serious, reappraisals so lacking, and consequences so dire that our foreign policy machinery cannot be trusted. The sooner the public realizes it, the better.
The war we got
The Taliban refusal to hand over bin Laden led to the decision for a forceful response. There were alternatives.
One would be interdicting al Qaeda money flows, mainly from the Gulf principalities, and killing key personnel through assassinations, air strikes, and special forces raids. This would have required relatively little money and very few casualties. Mossad did it after Munich. We could have done the same after New York.
A second would be a limited drive into Afghanistan in conjunction with the Northern Alliance, then engaging the Taliban in protracted conventional fighting which it could not win or end without accepting US terms. This would have entailed fewer GIs and might well have led to a stable, non-Taliban government in the north.
Washington opted to overthrow the Taliban, install a new government, and oversee sweeping reforms in state, society, and economy. Heady from quickly ousting the Taliban, Washington thought it could write its will across Afghanistan. This was the largest and most ambitious alternative. Only Americans could think of it. Only Americans could think there weren’t serious problems from the start.
Pakistan
The war entailed trusting Pakistan to break with the Taliban and keep US supply lines open. Strong ties between Pakistani generals and the Taliban were clear. The Afghan militants were important in Pakistan’s anti-India campaigns in Kashmir and a link to trade with the promising lands north of Afghanistan.
American military and intelligence personnel noted in 2001 that Pakistani Frontier Corps troops were fighting alongside the Taliban and al Qaeda in the north. Pakistani generals convinced the Bush administration to allow Pakistani and al Qaeda fighters to be flown out.
Americans on the ground called it Operation Evil Airlift. What was clear to them remained clouded in the minds of Washington policymakers. For the next twenty years Pakistan aided the Taliban and cashed American checks.
Remaking Afghanistan
In 1979 the Moscow-backed government in Kabul embarked on sweeping reforms across the country. The sudden and unwanted increase in Kabul’s power sparked anti-government protests in many parts of the country. The protests, with US support, turned into national rebellion and years of fighting ensued.
In 2002 the US and the fledgling Afghan state embarked on sweeping reforms across the country. The results were similar, though the war longer.
The new (Pashtun) government
Washington needed to build a new government as soon as possible. The US opted to use a traditional national council, or loya jirga, as a constitutional convention of sorts. Though steeped in the country’s history, the loya jirga was a means for Pashtun tribes to ensure their mastery of the country. The outcome was never in doubt.
The Pashtun government purged non-Pashtuns from key positions in army and state. The openings were filled mainly by Pashtun loyalists. Washington sat by. Pashtun corruption was enshrined and a debacle all but guaranteed.
Regional powers
Iran and Russia initially supported the US in Afghanistan. Iranian special forces helped the US and Northern Alliance expel the Taliban. Russia trained security forces and let supplies come in from Baltic ports and Kyrgyzstan.
By 2012 Tehran and Moscow were supporting the Taliban. It bled the US and won influence with a rising power. It also strengthened the Taliban and ensured their victory in one form or another.
Washington saw the Taliban’s new backing but failed to understand the importance. Success in Afghanistan was all the more difficult, if not impossible. The signs of impending defeat were clear. There was no response from Washington.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.