Brian M Downing
The Taliban have won and will govern, however cruelly, most of Afghanistan. This day could not have come without substantial support from Pakistan, in particular its army generals. The 2021 offensive launched attacks on three major cities in the south, several in the north, and in provinces around Kabul. That could not have been done without arms, communication gear, and money.
Only at the end did the Taliban seize the weapons and gear that the ANA abandoned in great haste and considerable abundance. Prior to that it was Pakistani support. In time we may learn of support from Iran and Russia, especially for Taliban forces in the north but the bulk over the last twenty years has come from Pakistan. The Taliban directed the war from safe locations in Pakistan which miraculously eluded Pakistani intelligence for twenty years.
The Taliban victory is a Pakistani victory, for now. The celebration below the Durand Line might be short.
The Taliban in Pakistan’s strategic thought
India is feared and detested in Pakistan. It defeated Pakistan in 1947, 1954, and 1971. In the latter war Pakistan lost its eastern territories, now known as Bangladesh – a deep humiliation that haunts the military to this day.
The generals worry that an Indian invasion could take over much of Pakistan’s Punjab and Sindh regions, the heart of the country. Afghanistan could serve as a redoubt where the army could gather strength and continue the war.
India’s presence in Kashmir is another problem. The province was about to join India when the British left in 1947 but Pakistan invaded and seized part and India did the same. The two armies skirmish routinely there. Pakistan uses bases in eastern Afghanistan to train guerrilla and terrorists who strike in Kashmir and in India itself. The generals employ al Qaeda to train the fighters.
The generals see Central Asia as a rich source of natural resources which if brought to world markets through Pakistani ports, would be an economic boon. In the early nineties Pakistan deemed the Taliban an ally that could help secure trade to the north and enrich army coffers. Pakistan oversaw the Taliban’s rise to power in 1992.
The Taliban was driven out in 2001 which put Pakistan’s strategic vision on hold. Pakistan bided its time, then backed the reconstituted Taliban to another victory. Central Asian riches are again within reach. Victory also proves Pakistan’s value to China, which is Pakistan’s chief ally now and the owner of much of Afghanistan’s natural resources – and of Central Asia’s as well. Pakistan believes it is assured a respected and lucrative position in China’s new order.
But nothing fails like success and Pakistan faces deep trouble.
The Taliban stigma
Pakistan’s importance in the Taliban victory will become clearer in coming months. American intelligence and military experts have held their fire to avoid upsetting Pakistan. Angry generals would close down US supply traffic into Afghanistan, as they’ve done in the past. Harsh criticism of Pakistan is coming.
The Taliban’s treatment of Afghans who worked with the US and ISAF will be avidly followed by outside media. The same can be said of the imposition of Sharia across the country, especially on women. Images of executions may be held back by the Taliban but countless ones of burkas and closed schools will get out.
Jihadism
In 2001, international jihadism focused on the United States. Its troops were in Saudi Arabia, not far from Mecca and Medina. The jihadi target list has grown significantly since then. Russia has been struck for leveling Chechen and Syrian cities with long bombardments. Iran has been struck for its Shia religion and opposition to Saudi Arabia and Israel. China is deeply worried about becoming high on the target list for its treatment of Uighur in Xinjiang. There are scores of Uighur in jihadi groups in Afghanistan.
All three states will press Pakistan to drop support to jihadi client groups in eastern Afghanistan. They will also want the Taliban to destroy jihadism root and branch.
Pashtun nationalism
The Taliban are essentially a Pashtun movement that grew out of a southern mujahideen group and expanded during the chaos after the Soviet pullout in 1988. Since 2001 the Taliban have aligned with scores of Pashtun tribes, developed ties with several foreign powers, and conquered most of Afghanistan – for the second time.
In the heady aftermath of victory, and with memories of past grievances calling for attention, the Taliban may be looking to the Pashtun region of Pakistan – the former North-West Frontier Province, now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Afghan Pashtuns see that region as unfairly taken from them by the British and incorporated into Pakistan in 1947. The Pashtun of Pakistan have long helped the Taliban with supplies and safe havens and the common heritage has been strengthened.
Pakistan’s authority in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is tenuous. Islamabad in 1947 accepted British treaties granting the region a measure of autonomy. Pashtun tribes, some of them, are at war with Islamabad and are eager to reduce its presence.
The Taliban recently announced its cabinet which includes Sirajuddin Haqqani as second-in-command. His family, though Afghan, has long been based in Pakistan where it is heavily involved in smuggling and kidnapping. His presence in government may signal ambitions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and a Taliban Anschluss may be coming.
Pakistan sees this and greatly fears loss of territory, as in 1971. The army may have to take steps to quash Pashtun separatism but this would require protracted operations in mountainous terrain. Baluch separatists would love to see the Pashtuns succeed or at least mire the Pakistani army in a lengthy, costly conflict.
Victory in Afghanistan may bring deep trouble. Pakistan will face international opprobrium over Taliban rule, demands from China to break with jihadi groups in Afghanistan, and face separatism that could cut the country in half. Yes, nothing fails like success.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.