Brian M Downing
The US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel are determined to bring change to Iran. They claim it’s violating the JCPOA, supporting terrorism, and aggressively expanding its influence in the region. The US has reimposed sanctions. More will follow in the autumn. This three-power entente wants to soften demand for Iranian oil and gas and encourage substantial if not destabilizing opposition.
The US has eased its stated aim from deposing the regime to simply effecting policy changes in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The entente, however, most likely wants regime change or collapse. The pressure is on, discontent in evidence. But conflicts seldom play out as leaders and strategists expect. What are the likely outcomes of the anti-Iran campaign?
Policy changes
Sanctions and other pressures could force Tehran to realize it can no longer maintain troops in Syria. It may also rethink support for Hisbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and the Shia mercenary brigades it has patched together in recent years. Maintaining those positions risks grave fiscal troubles and worsening domestic unrest. A pullback will be reluctantly ordered.
This is unlikely though. Regime supporters will see pullback as caving in to enemies and isolating the country from needed allies. Among the pious, a sizable part of the Iranian public that rarely figures adequately in foreign assessments, abandoning fellow Shia will demonstrate not only weakness but also faithlessness. Secular middle classes, a modest part of the Iranian public that figures highly in foreign assessments, will see the mullahs and generals as on their back foot. They will step up pressure for substantive reforms. The Iranian leadership must know these problems and will avoid policy changes.
Iran’s leaders may also judge that policy changes will not ease efforts to weaken the country and that the entente has a less benign outcome in mind. Furthermore, they may have read de Tocqueville. He observed that when France’s ancien regime showed willingness to accede to change, opposition became more insistent and the Bourbons fell.
Strategists in Washington, Jerusalem, and Riyadh may have read de Tocqueville even more diligently. That is, they know if Tehran heeds call for change, it will strengthen opposition and ultimately bring destabilization.
Transition toward democracy
The Tehran leadership could sense their grip on the country is failing and accede to domestic calls for democracy – something that many Iranians have wanted since the 1920s. This resonates with the West’s belief in democracy’s inevitability and Americans’ confidence in the good intentions of their foreign policy.
This outcome too is improbable. Mullahs and generals, like most authoritarian leaders, are loth to relinquish power and well equipped with justifications for their positions and privileges. The mullahs and generals believe democracy brings moral decay, incompetent leaders, and state paralysis. They can look around the Middle East and see attempts at democracy leading to chaos, separatism, civil war, and the rise of Sunni extremism. Iran would be vulnerable to insurgencies, terrorism, and devastating foreign invasion as in 1980 amid the tumultuous revolution.
Democracy in Iran would cause shudders in other Gulf states. A viable democratic government just to the east would undermine monarchal authority in Bahrain, the Emirates, Kuwait, and most portentously, Saudi Arabia. This outcome will not be pursued or accepted in entente capitals.
Turmoil and collapse
Foreign pressures could bring strong anti-regime demonstrations and even upheavals in many cities. Disaffected Kurds, Azaris, Arabs, and Balochs could demand autonomy and take on officials and soldiers. The mullahs and generals could then face severe fiscal troubles and gravely weakened repressive capacities, especially if military personnel drawn from the general public refuse orders or defect. Iran could be driven toward fragmentation as have Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Iran’s disintegration is appealing to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh would dominate the Gulf. Its Sunni partners would be in line if not in awe, Shia populations would have no powerful ally, and the House of Saud’s rule would be infused with power prestige at a pivotal time of generational succession.
Foreign troops may occupy Khuzestan, Iran’s oil-rich Arab region. That would be presented as merely a temporary measure to establish order and calm markets, though occupation might have to last many years. The House of Saud would have far more proven reserves and wealth than they already have.
The prospect of Iran’s dissolution should bring ambivalence in Israel. Hisbollah would lose financial support and military supplies. Syria, already shattered by civil war, would have no regional support and would be all the more intimidated by Israeli military power. Israel, however, would have to contend with an ambitious young Saudi ruler who bestrides a victorious Sunni alliance stretching from Egypt to Khuzestan.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.