Brian M Downing
Sectarian conflict, chiefly between Saudi Arabia and Iran, has been underway for decades. Based at least as much on religious hatred as on national security, it reached intense levels with the Iran-Iraq War of the 80s which took hundreds of thousands of lives. Afterward, animosities lessened but picked up again during the civil war in Syria. The conflict has taken on a more aggressive and international form with the coalescence of President Trump’s new national security team.
One outcome, a triumphant Saudi Arabia, has already been considered. (“Outcome scenarios in the sectarian wars: Saudi Arabia triumphant,” 14 May 2018) A Saudi victory would bring new problems for the region and the US. Another outcome, protracted stalemate, is looked at here.
The war
A large-scale engagement between Sunni and Shia conventional forces is possible but unlikely. The Iran-Iraq War was a precedent but Iraq’s army and state are now under Shia authority. The country will be preoccupied with reconstruction and political stability for several years and uninterested in ideas from think tanks and the House of Saudi. Iraq’s unlikely to listen to Tehran’s entreaties either.
The Saudi army and guard units are exceptionally well-armed and have benefited from years of US training programs. But they’re far less numerous than Iran’s and probably less well led and motivated. The Iranians gained a modicum of combat experience in Syria. Saudi troops patrol rear areas in Yemen.
In a protracted conflict, the Saudis and regional allies will press for American ground troops, say, several divisions, to invade Iran. Determination to see Iran suffer is high in Washington, and the American public, largely detached from wars and casualties, will present little opposition. Military leaders, active duty and retired, might be more cautious. They know, even if the politicians do not, that the Iranian military and militias can put up spirited resistance that could mire the US in a costly war. It could also rally the Iranian people to the mullahs, when the aim is to increase popular antagonism toward their rulers.
A limited incursion by US troops, perhaps near the Arab region in western Iran, might be more acceptable. This, it would be hoped, will force Tehran to negotiate a settlement, if not hand over power to the public – regime change. This too is unlikely but pro-war forces are powerful and their “Iran just needs a little push” argument seductive. Neoconservatives might see a threat of invasion leading to a determined nuclear weapons program, which would bring further international isolation and swift US airstrikes.
The conflict, though, will probably be confined to proxy wars in Syria, Yemen, and possibly western Iraq. Fighting could spread to other countries and other forms of warfare.
Spillovers
Low-scale fighting could take place along the Afghanistan-Iran border region where the IRGC is extending limited help to the Taliban. Help will probably increase. (This has been addressed in “Iran, the US, and Afghanistan in the sectarian conflict,” 5 May 2018.)
Both sides could engage in terrorism. Mossad can best the IRGC in this regard. Further, terrorism would turn the EU and other parts of the world against Iran.
Iraq is almost certain to become a theater, though perhaps one limited to diplomatic wrangling. The Maliki and Abadi governments steered a neutral course between Tehran and Washington. The apparent new power holder, Muqtada al Sadr, is not easy to comprehend let alone predict. His militias fought the US yet he opposes Iran too. The most revered Shia cleric, Ali al Sistani, despite being raised in eastern Iran, also wants to avoid Tehran’s influence and theocratic government. He holds tremendous sway but he’s aged and infirm. Sadr will seek to take his place.
The US, UK, and Saudi Arabia are engaged in consolidating a Sunni statelet in eastern Syria which is of course contiguous to the restive Sunni region of Iraq. The Saudis and their allies will encourage Iraq’s Sunnis to support the Syrian statelet, if not break away from Baghdad and align with it. This, though, would drive Baghdad closer to Tehran.
The Iran-Iraq War spilled over into attacks on belligerents’ oil assets. Fighters and naval vessels struck oil tankers and offshore platforms in the Gulf. Saudi jets skirmished with those of Iran. The US leaned toward the Sunnis then, but nonetheless sold Hawk and TOW missiles to Iran. Today American naval and air assets are squarely behind the Sunnis and skirmishes will not favor Iran.
Both sides in the Iran-Iraq War encouraged insurgencies inside the other’s territory. Iran successfully developed Shia political and military organizations inside Iraq. They were widespread but did not undermine Saddam’s war effort. Similarly, Iraq encouraged the Arabs of western Iran to rise up – without success. Kurds on both sides were encouraged to fight their governments. The ongoing sectarian conflict will see a reprise of efforts to stir insurgencies and bring defeat on the enemy.
(Part two : benefits and risks from stalemate)
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.