Brian M Downing
Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran began to deteriorate with the Khomeini revolution (1979) and worsened in recent years as Tehran’s nuclear program advanced. A proxy war has been underway in Yemen for several years and two more loom in Syria and Iraq. Armies trained more diligently, publics braced themselves, and defense contractors headed for Gulf capitals.
Nonetheless, two weeks ago the Saudi crown prince signaled unease with the stalemate in Yemen and also willingness to open talks with Iran. No one expects good relations and cooperativeness to come to the region in coming years. Several obstacles stand in the path.
Yemen
The impoverished country in the south of the Arabian Peninsula, devastated by war for several years now, might be a place where the Saudis and Iranians can find common ground.
Iran supports the Shias in the north, Saudi Arabia and its allies back the Sunnis in the south. The conflict is less about religious disputes than about regional differences. Never truly a viable country, Yemen is an uncomfortable and unworkable union of a northern region that developed under Ottoman rule and a southern one that was under British influence.
The two regions are engaged in their third civil war and accommodating leaders in Tehran and Riyadh could see partition as a way of reducing tensions between their countries and easing Yemen’s agony. More serious problems would remain, though.
Saudi diplomacy
Despite the overture to Iran, Saudi Arabia is trying to convince Russia to reduce support to Iran. Key enticements are cooperation on oil prices and large purchases of Russian arms – a boon for the sluggish Russian economy.
Furthermore, Riyadh has been courting Shia leaders in Iraq, especially Moqtada al Sadr who leads the Shia militias. Usually seen as a cat’s paw of Tehran, the view here has long been that Sadr is an opportunistic actor whose ambitions greatly exceed his principles.
Iran is unlikely to be deeply impressed with Riyadh’s gestures as long as the Saudis are trying to isolate it from Russia and purchase the loyalty of Shia militias in Iraq. The Saudis may be judged as simply buying time until better positioned to deal with Iran.
Iraq and Syria
Shia rulers in Iraq and Syria have lost control of much of their Sunni populations in eastern Syria and western Iraq. This has led to territories under al Qaeda and ISIL rule but these areas are shrinking, leaving them open to non-Islamist Sunni movements – and Saudi intrigue.
Determined to weaken Iranian-Shia power, the Saudis have been maneuvering to see that neither Baghdad nor Damascus can reassert control over lost territory. Most portentous among these maneuvers is positioning Sunni militias in eastern Syria to interrupt land communication between Iran and its allies in Syria and Lebanon. The US has helped in this campaign.
If there is any dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Tehran will insist on secure land communication with allies to the west. Given the chaotic nature of eastern Syria and western Iraq, where Sunni militias are de facto governments, this will be hard to deliver, regardless of Riyadh’s disposition or instruction.
Wahhabism
Iran might seek an agreement by which Saudi Arabia reduces anti-Shia rhetoric in schools and mosques funded by the Kingdom and spread across the Islamic world. Such content encourages hostility toward the Shia and also murderous attacks on them, especially in Pakistan. The spread of Wahhabism and its export version, Salafism, throughout the region increases fundamentalist passions, militancy, and popular support for Saudi Arabia.
Diluting Wahhabism would not sit well inside Saudi Arabia and is highly unlikely to occur. Clerics in the Kingdom’s councils will adamantly oppose it and brand advocates of dilution as apostates and dupes of the West and Israel. If the ruling clique were to unwisely support dilution, disgruntled clerics and marginalized princes could pose a serious problem for the impending royal succession, which will transfer power from the aged sons of Abdul Aziz to a younger clique. (And of course Iran’s military and religious elite may also oppose detente.)
• • •
Paradoxically, though the US and Israel oppose Iran on almost everything, they must recognize the destabilizing effect of the spread of Wahhabism, which after all is a course of instruction that leads many adherents to pursue graduate studies with ISIL and al Qaeda.
The United States and Israel are integral parts of the anti-Iran coalition. They will oppose detente and do whatever they can to prevent it – an issue worthy of its own article.
Copyright 2017 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.