Brian M Downing
Only a few weeks ago leaders in Washington and Pyongyang were trading threats and even insults. Some people thought East Asia was approaching nuclear war. A false alarm of an incoming missile brought consternation in Hawaii. A year ago it would have brought nothing. Though a few compliments were occasionally tossed into speeches, expectations were that the two countries were tangled in a dangerous crisis.
A sudden change took place in recent weeks. Kim Jong-un crossed the 38th Parallel and met with his S Korean counterpart. He is set to meet with President Trump next month. What might the meetings bring?
Denuclearization
Attention on the meetings became heightened when Kim announced a halt to nuclear weapons and missile tests and put denuclearization on the agenda. However, the offers are less than they appear. N Korea is no longer able to conduct weapons tests as its site near the border with China has collapsed, as was warned in past months. Missile tests could return though.
N Korea will not denuclearize. The claim is so unrealistic that analysts are wondering what Kim even means by the term. The North’s nuclear weapons, bulky and largely undeliverable though they may be, are insurance against foreign invasion. Pyongyang knows that if Saddam had possessed nuclear weapons, he’d be in power today.
The arsenal also confers power prestige and legitimacy on the regime – badly needed in so impoverished a land. Recall that announcements of various tests apparently led to genuine euphoria. The weapons will serve as a symbol of national unity in a time of momentous and possibly jarring social change.
The more the North talks up denuclearization, the more circumspect the US and East Asian states should be. The longer it takes Washington to realize this, if it hasn’t already, the more the North will suspect it’s dealing with an overeager adversary.
Scenario 1: Chinese and N Korean stealth
The position here has been that N Korea is an irksome but useful ally of China. It ties down large numbers of American and East Asian military assets and demonstrates that the US can no longer guarantee regional security. And one day it will be clear that by controlling N Korea, China has assumed that role.
Talks may near a significant deal when Beijing suddenly presents itself as the true dealmaker, pressing a seemingly intransigent Pyongyang to agree. Alternately, though similarly, talks break down and the threats return. China and N Korea cease the vitriol and restart talks with the South, without full participation of the US which they claim to be belligerent and intransigent.
In either case, talks could lead to a peace treaty between North and South. Naturally, it will be negotiated and inked in Beijing. If shaped by China, the treaty would signal a shift in power across East Asia and the world. A treaty would bring genuine euphoria to both sides of the 38th Parallel, and some troops might pull back from the bunker lines on both sides. But it could prove no more enduring than the Versailles Treaty or Paris Peace Talks. Nonetheless, China would be the winner, America the loser.
Scenario 2: N Korean triangulation
Kim Jong-un is youthful but he might recognize the usefulness of playing off rivals in world politics. Nasser played the game well during much of the Cold War. Pakistan relishes its position between the US and China, gaining advantages and money from both, as each power wants influence in S Asia and doesn’t want its rival to prevail. Turkey does the same now with the US and Russia.
If Kim doesn’t see the advantages to triangulation, the leader across the table from him will point them out as they work on a deal.
Kim can distance himself from China and draw nearer to S Korea, Japan, and the US. In so doing he can get development aid from many rich countries and speed the North’s economic development. It would be a remarkable achievement for the young ruler. He would free his country from Chinese vassalage and himself from the long shadows of his father and grandfather.
That too can be pointed out to him. Towering egos will be on both sides of the table.
Risks abound, of course. Beijing will be livid about rising foreign influence on its border. It might try to oust Kim, but he and his predecessors have been watchful if not paranoid of their generals getting close to China. Many have been executed. The half-brother that Kim poisoned in Malaysia last year was deemed complicit in Chinese intrigue. Could Chinese troops cross the Yalu again to prevent losing a buffer? Perhaps, but Kim has a formidable army and the invasion insurance that Saddam lacked.
N Korean generals might be uneasy about sudden collaboration with longstanding enemies. They might attempt a coup, perhaps with newly-emerged Chinese support. Beijing might be helpful in a decapitation strike.
The US and East Asia face risks, too. Kim’s triangulation might leave them with a more economically-advanced opponent on the Korean peninsula. And China, instead of having an impoverished dependency on its border, would have a more powerful ally.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.