Last month, under the weight of rebel pressure, the Syrian army pulled back from northern Syria. Since then Russia has deployed scores of attack aircraft and begun an air campaign, mostly on non-ISIL factions. Iran, too, has increased its support for a beleaguered ally. IRGC advisers have been in country for a year or more and now are said to be now complemented by hundreds of ground troops.
Syria, Russia, Iran, and Hisbollah have begun an offensive to retake positions in the north, including Aleppo and Idlib. Fresh and probably heartened ground troops, backed by Russian airpower, may change the back-and-forth conflict of the last few years. A few thoughts.
Rebel troop concentrations The rebels are facing concentrated government and allied forces as they drive north. If the rebels want to hold on to hard-won cities, which confer credibility as an alternative government and not just an armed band, they will have to concentrate their troops in defensive positions and reserve positions.
The effectiveness of tactical airstrikes on concentrated troops was shown earlier this year at Kobane, where Kurdish militias backed by US air support repelled ISIL and inflicted the first defeat on the Islamist force. Syrian rebels in all likelihood will be on the defensive as they face Syrian troops and Russian airpower. Though there are significant advantages to troops fighting defensively, especially from fortified positions, they are also vulnerable to air power. Rebel formations may have to decide whether to hold their ground and suffer substantial casualties, or to retreat from urban centers.
Rebel forces are not well supplied with shoulder-fired missiles which might counter Russian fighter aircraft, or at least force them to bomb from higher altitudes and at greater speeds, decreasing accuracy. The US is loth to dispense its Stingers in the chaotic region. Saudi Arabia promised last year to deliver a similar Chinese weapon (FN-6), but they have not appeared in theater, perhaps out of Beijing’s deference to Moscow. (In any case, as I’ve noted before, there’s no evidence the introduction of Stingers into the Afghan war increased Russian aircraft losses. It wasn’t Charlie Wilson’s war.)
Attrition The government offensive may effect a victory of sorts even without taking rebel positions. It may be able to inflict serious casualties on rebel forces such that, in months to come as they are no longer able to replenish their ranks with recruits, their effectiveness deteriorates.
Attrition is a two-way street, though. Government forces and Hisbollah are thought to be weakened by years of battle. If further weakened, this may force Iran to increase its troops presence. It could also force Russia to send in the volunteers it spoke of in recent days. Neither power is likely to welcome an open-ended ground war.
Rebel alliances The government offensive may encourage various rebel factions, including ISIL and the al Nusrah Front, to coordinate their defenses. This would be a propaganda coup for Damascus, Moscow, and Tehran as it would give some credence to their depiction of the war as between civilization and terrorism.
Substantial cooperation between the radical Islamist groups and the comparatively moderate ones is unlikely. They have histories of fighting each other, rivalrous commanders, and conflicting foreign backers. However, politics makes for strange bedfellows and wars make for aberrant ones.
Government forces vs ISIL The less radical rebel forces may, through maneuver or tenacity, channel the government forces toward ISIL positions. This would be unwelcome in Damascus as it wants to wear down the less radical rebels in order to present the war as civilization versus terrorism. Fortune and rebel adroitness may thwart Damascus’s plan. Government troops, then, may either engage in costly engagements with ISIL, or refrain from doing so and weaken the Syrian-Russian propaganda line, frail, cynical, and tedious though it already is.
©2015 Brian M Downing