Brian M Downing
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is one of the clearest cases aggression since the Third Reich attacked Poland. Nonetheless, or predictably, responsibility is debated, with some asserting that NATO expansion to the east is to blame. This of course is the Kremlin’s position. It’s been picked up by antiwar groups, contrarians, and politicians with sympathies toward Moscow.
Blaming NATO has gotten some credibility from a few international relations hands of the hard-nosed realist camp. Expansion to the east, they argue, led to legitimate security concerns in Russia – and Putin acted. Drawn from political science models, the argument was published in periodicals, presented on news programs, and saluted by followers. Such arguments often seek to stir controversy and advance careers. Not all of them stand up.
NATO has never constituted an offensive threat to Russia. Founded in 1949, shortly after Stalin solidified control over Eastern Europe, NATO centered on deterring or countering further Soviet expansion, not invading Moscow’s holdings. This held true despite clear superiority in weaponry, training, and leadership. Revolts in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia did not bring attacks or incursions. Nor did they even get meaningful support. When the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed, NATO forces didn’t cross border checkpoints and liberate the east. Post-communist governments ordered Soviet forces out.
NATO’s only major operation was the Afghan war after the September 11 attacks. Though it led to Western troops close to Russia and its Near Abroad, Putin supported the war. He allowed NATO to send supplies across Russia from Baltic ports and use an airbase in Kyrgyzstan. Russians trained the new Afghan government’s security forces. However, as plans to restore Russian power developed, he surreptitiously backed the Taliban and invaded former SSR Georgia.
A NATO attack on Russia would’ve required strong support from member states. That was never possible. Most were reluctant to meet defensive requirements and starting a major war was unthinkable. Martial traditions were strong in 1914 but faded considerably after the world wars. This was especially so in Germany – an essential base of operations and manpower source for a Barbarossa Redux.
This isn’t a new revelation from the corridors of Brussels. It’s been clear for decades. Putin is knowledgeable of the West’s aversion toward war. His foreign policy, media, and cyberwarfare units play upon it. Meanwhile, he’s been diligently reinvigorating militarism at home.
The Baltic states, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and others didn’t join NATO to threaten Russia. They’d been partitioned, invaded, and oppressed by Russia for years and wanted security from a probable if not inevitable resurgence of nationalist aggression. NATO remained defensive. Russia did not remain unaggressive.
Next: bases of Russian expansionism.
In memory of Willard A “Chick” Moody – an old basketball friend.
©2024 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.