Brian M Downing
The new approach to fighting the Taliban calls for building up local Afghan forces – militias and tribal levies. While this is a welcome departure from the neglect and reliance on massive firepower of past years, the approach will face many obstacles.
Local forces, from the Soviet occupation to the present, have not worked well with the Afghan national army. Preferring to remain in their districts, many Afghans choose service in local militaries, presenting personnel problems for the army. Militias are resented for draining military resources better allocated, in the army’s view, to them. Attempts over the years to amalgamate militias and army have met with failure.
But local forces offer many advantages in counterinsurgency warfare. They know the terrain, where insurgent patrols are, and where their encampments are likely to be. Often locals even have a good idea who the insurgents are, as all insurgencies are local. Militias can use village social networks (qawms) to importune an insurgent or two, and in time more, to quit. Indeed local militias, inasmuch as they are an acceptable middle ground between the government and the insurgents, provide an honorable way for insurgents to leave without overtly siding with the enemy.
It is essential to have a coordinating agency in the localities, to establish information channels among police, intelligence, and militias – none of whom is accustomed or disposed to share information – and to establish reaction forces in the event the Taliban attacks a village outpost in strength. Without the assurance of a rapid response force, many militias will not fight.
Local forces can also be problems for counterinsurgency operations. They are prone to fight only on their terms, establish independent truces with the enemy, and often look upon an attack on a nearby village with various degrees of indifference. Three decades of warfare have left many young men with soldierly swagger and condescension for farmers and herdsmen. Local forces are known to shakedown merchants and farmers. Many see themselves as laws unto themselves, above the mundane civilians around them. Unless firmly tied to a tribal authority, they can degenerate into a new generation of warlords, regardless of instructions from the US and NATO. And of course this lawlessness is hopelessly antithetical to counterinsurgency programs.
In the absence of an effective government in Kabul, the burden of bolstering local forces, providing response teams, instilling discipline, and otherwise waging a counterinsurgency will fall on US/NATO forces – probably more on the US if only because in the aftermath of the Sunni Awakening in Iraq, it feels it has mastered the principles and practice of counterinsurgency.
At best, the Kabul government can be a prominent but weak partner – one that is in appearance and fact more of a client. The true relationship will be apparent to Afghans and will underscore the perception among many of them that western forces have overstayed their welcome.
Copyright 2009 Brian M Downing