Brian M Downing
Diplomatic history knows of the Zinoviev letter and Zimmerman telegram. One day President Trump’s tweets may be recorded. Over the weekend he scuttled impending talks with the Taliban, apparently because of a recent terrorist attack. No one can be sure that in a day or two he won’t tweet the talks back on, or insist his cyber-missive was misunderstood.
So where does a US withdrawal, which is supported here, stand? What will come of this weekend’s events?
The attack
The talks have been put aside because of a terrorist bombing in Kabul and attacks on ANA troops which led to US deaths. There’ve been a spate of such attacks ever since the Qatar talks seemed promising. However, attributing responsibility isn’t easy. The Taliban isn’t an organization with clearly defined membership. It’s a confederation comprising numerous factions, tribal militias, and allied groups.
There’s always been conflict between an internationalist faction which wants to expand Islam beyond Afghanistan and a nationalist one that’s content to focus inward. Internationalists see a peace deal as betrayal of the Islamist cause and may be acting to prevent it.
The Haqqani network, a Pakistani militant group, might also oppose a deal as it would isolate them and make them vulnerable to a crackdown by Islamabad. The Haqqanis have been responsible for many of the most lethal bombings in Afghanistan over the years.
The Taliban response
Thus far the Taliban have reacted in a controlled manner to Trump’s cancellation. Their spokesmen have noted that it may cause the war to drag on and endanger American lives. This of course contrasts with more belligerent statements coming over the last eighteen years – perhaps a sign that key parts want the deal.
If talks do not pick up, the Taliban may escalate attacks on US personnel. There’s already been an increase in US casualties over the last few months which suggests a policy of targeting Americans has already begun.
A large-scale attack on a major city could also take place. This would convey power and test the Afghan army’s resolve. However, previous attempts have been repelled, probably with devious casualties, as the US has airlifted reaction forces and pounded troop concentrations with airstrikes. Indeed, failure to seize and hold major cities and attendant casualties probably made the Taliban more amenable to talks this year.
The Taliban and militancy
Negotiations are thought to entail a Taliban effort to eradicate groups such as al Qaeda and ISIL. This is unrealistic, regardless of American hopes and Taliban intentions. As noted, there are internationalist parts of the Taliban which will support AQ and ISIL. This will bring fighting and numerous suggest the internationalists cannot win, at least in large parts of Taliban turf.
However, in the rugged southeast AQ, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the Islamist Movement of Uzbekistan are firmly
ensconced. They are aligned with fiercely-independent local tribes which have for centuries avoided integration into the two main Pashtun confederations and resisted Kabul’s authority, regardless of who was on top there.
These groups enjoy Pakistan’s support. They train guerrillas to attack targets in Indian-administered Kashmir and sometimes inside India itself, as with the 2008 Mumbai attack. India’s recent semi-annexation of its Kashmiri territory will greatly augment those groups in Pakistani planning.
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The President would do well to reconsider talks with the Taliban, though not as expected. The US should not linger there another year or more, as the current deal requires. He should inform China, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan of a compete US withdrawal in the next year and advise them to collaborate on handling Afghanistan in the future.
This cannot be called cutting and running, not after eighteen years of fighting and casualties. Nor would it endanger the US. Indeed, we would benefit from saddling Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and Pakistani adversaries with an insoluble problem along their borders. The US could concentrate on more strategically important parts of the world, and be rid of a long war in a corrupt, fragmented, and landlocked part of Central Asia.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.