Kurdistan fights ISIL at Mosul
Brian M Downing
In recent days, Kurdish forces have engaged ISIL counterparts around the northern city of Mosul, which fell to the Islamist forces two years ago. The Iraqi army’s drive from the south was halted by fierce ISIL resistance and by turmoil in the Baghdad government. Nonetheless, Kurdish troops continue the fight.
Why are the Kurds, who have taken high casualties already and are near bankruptcy, pressing ISIL around an Arab city which, unlike other cities such as Kirkuk, the Kurds have no claim?
Coordinated offensive
ISIL is being attacked in three areas. In Syria, an Arab-Kurdish force is attacking the Manbij pocket – an ISIL support region along the Turkish border. The effort is said to be going well and it sets the stage for an attack on the ISIL capital of Raqqa in coming weeks.
In Iraq, the national army and Shia militias faced fierce resistance from ISIL positions south of Mosul, and opted to break off the campaign. They are now attempting to retake Fallujah – the town 50 miles west of Baghdad that was the scene of sharp engagements between US troops and Sunni guerrillas ten years ago. Settling on Fallujah instead of Mosul is a sign of the frailty of Iraqi troops which took serious casualties in the recent battle of Ramadi.
The peshmerga attacks near Mosul are unlikely designed to retake the city. The Kurds have no desire to liberate Arab oppressors, nor do they have historical claim to the land. The Kurds are expected to keep pressure on the major ISIL position to prevent the Islamists from reinforcing Raqqa and Fallujah.
This raises the question of who is coordinating the offensives in a region far more given to antagonism than to cooperation. Baghdad has very little influence with Iraqi Kurds, none with Syrian Kurds and Arabs. Iran has influence with Iraqi Kurds and Shia militias, none with the Syrian forces which are hostile to the government Iran is supporting.
The US is almost certainly the chief coordinator of the disparate forces in Syria and Iraq, and supporting each with airstrikes and advisers and logistics. It constitutes a significant achievement, though one whose success is not assured and whose denouement is clouded.
Kurdish ambitions beyond Mosul
The Kurds will use the territory they are seizing around Mosul as bargaining chips. They have come a long way in their effort for independence – their own army, constitution, and pipeline to the sea. Returning parts of the north to Baghdad will come at the price of recognizing Kurdistan’s independence.
The Kurds have been the most effective forces arrayed against ISIL, winning the admiration of many publics, especially in the West. This was true at Kobane, where Syrian Kurds inflicted a stunning defeat on ISIL, and at Sinjar, where Iraqi Kurds cut communications between ISIL’s two largest holdings – Raqqa and Mosul.
Continued success against ISIL will win greater foreign aid, willingness to buy Kurdish oil which Baghdad continues to have legal claim to, and international support for independence.
Risks
Kurdistan’s forces will operate cautiously around Mosul. They have already taken high casualties since ISIL drove into northern Iraq and Kurdistan two years ago. ISIL troops, as demonstrated at the battle of Ramadi earlier this year, continue to have remarkable fighting spirit. They are capable of inflicting serious losses on attacking 
forces at all three battle sites, especially as ISIL troops are in well-fortified positions.
Kurdistan’s forces do not have a unified command system. Units are loyal to political parties and tribal chieftains, not solely to the prime minister in Erbil. Serious casualties will deepen internal conflicts between generals and between politicians. This will not come as news to ISIL, which it must be reluctantly admitted, still has the best army the region has seen in decades if not centuries.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.