Brian M Downing
The Afghan conflict has burdened the United States since 2001, at least. Troops and money poured in though with little success in building stability. President Trump was inclined to pull out of what seemed a failed business venture but key advisors, mostly generals, dissuaded him. The US will send more troops and money until conditions permit a departure.
The announcement had a number of stirring lines but no new ideas. Indeed, it had dismaying references to, if not boasts of, open-endedness. The idea of exit strategies never took hold in Washington anyway. Afghanistan and parts of Central Asia will see a significant rise in international jihadism in coming years. American troops will be in the middle of it. Trump may regret not going with his gut feeling.
The Taliban and international jihadism
Islamic fighters streamed into Afghanistan to fight the Soviet Union, thereby beginning the networks and ideology of modern jihadism. (Paradoxically, this was encouraged and even funded by the Reagan administration.) When the Taliban took power in the chaotic aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, they avoided internationalism and concentrated on reconstruction. The leader, Mullah Omar, permitted al Qaeda to maintain a presence – against the counsel of many in the governing shura – but Omar was unaware of bin Laden’s plans to strike inside the United States.
After the US and Northern Alliance expelled the Taliban in late 2001, some on the Taliban shura argued for an aggressive internationalist agenda. Omar remained on a nationalist course. The Taliban wanted to restore its emirate, not someone’s long-dead empire.
The war against the US and the Kabul government did not attract foreign fighters nearly as much as the Soviet war did. The US intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11 was not seen as entirely unjust. On the other hand, jihadis were angered by the subsequent Iraq invasion and made it their cause.
The potential for jihadism today
Afghanistan is attracting international jihadis now. The appeal of ISIL is global, even in the remote hills above and below the Durand Line. Large parts of the country are lawless, as were eastern Syria, western Iraq, and the Libyan coast. A stronger government presence might be a judicious countermove, but the Kabul government is hopelessly incompetent and the US wants no part of anymore statemaking.
ISIL has established small pockets in the south and east. The Taliban fight these foreign rivals in some places but fight alongside them elsewhere. Nothing is simple in Afghanistan. ISIL’s ranks will grow as jihadis flee Iraq and Syria, where their positions in major cities are being reduced and their claim to being a state is losing credibility. Many are outspoken in their plans to use Afghanistan as a base of operations against Russia, which helped defeat them in Syria. And what better place to renew the struggle for the caliphate than Khorasan?
The cause will have regional support. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and western China are experiencing Islamist ferment. Contingents of their subjects serve with ISIL in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Pakistan supports a slew of jihadi forces ensconced in eastern Afghanistan which train guerrillas to fight India. Parts of Pakistan’s own Taliban, the TTP, have already sworn allegiance to ISIL already.
An increase of American and western troops in Afghanistan will be a boon for jihadism in the region. Recruitment and funding will increase, disparate groups will find common cause. A more judicious approach would be to cede parts of Afghanistan to the Taliban on the condition they eliminate international jihadism from their domain. Judicious, but unlikely in the near future.
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In a year or so, the United States may find Afghanistan and the region more unstable than today. One option would be to finally heed calls to withdraw and hand over the mission of eliminating jihadism to regional powers – Russia, China, Pakistan, and Iran. Inasmuch as they are adversaries of the US, such a move would be a geopolitical masterstroke.
This outcome may not be planned out in Washington, but it’s almost certainly being fretted over in Moscow, Beijing, Islamabad, and Tehran.
Copyright 2017 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.