Israeli security and the Arab wars
Brian M Downing
The promise of political reform and greater tranquility in countries around Israel is largely gone, at least for the foreseeable future. Only Jordan and Tunisia have representative governments. Elsewhere, civil wars, insurgencies, terrorism, and autocrats are the rule.
To Israel’s west, bedouin tribes, al Qaeda, and ISIL are fighting the Egyptian state. Farther west, Libya has disintegrated into countless pieces. To the Northeast, Syria has broken into warring statelets and militias. Farther east, Iraq too is breaking apart into three or more statelets.
Yet paradoxically, Israel’s security is quite strong. Three historical enemies no longer exist; a fourth is mired in domestic turmoil. Israel may be safer now than at any time since its founding in 1948.
Iraq
Ending Saddam Hussein’s rule and bringing in representative government brought an unstable Shia government and a bitterly resentful Sunni population. Sectarian animosity rages and the Sunnis search for a way to establish autonomy or independence. The Kurds have established autonomy and seek full independence. Iraq, a sworn though not especially active enemy of Israel, is no longer capable of action against Israel. It can barely mobilize the resources and will to fight ISIL.
The Shia parties that govern what they can of the country are unable to form a stable government. Whatever coherence there is came only after considerable pressure from the US and Iran, who though at odds, and supportive of different parties, want a stable Iraq and a reliable foe of ISIL. Despite the threat of a murderous Islamist army not far from Baghdad, political unity and even basic military reforms have failed to come about.
This regional fragmentation and political turmoil was not foreseen by American strategists who argued for the 2003 invasion. The prospects of a broken Iraq might not have eluded Israeli counterparts, whose proximity and realpolitik offered greater insights into Iraq’s frailties.
Iraq no longer exists.
Syria
When popular protests against the Assad government were harshly repressed, and civil war erupted, Israel was in a quandary. Assad was no friend, but he was a known item. Who knew what would come if his rule ended?
Syria has broken part into a dozen or more statelets under the rule of warlords and militia commanders, most of them backed by antagonistic foreign powers. Israel has concentrated on weakening Hisbollah forces that fight for Assad, and on convincing the Druze people east of Golan to break away from Damascus and become an autonomous region under Israeli protection.
Another enemy no longer exists.
Egypt
The recent years have been less destructive for Egypt, though it has far more internal trouble than it had a decade ago. The old oligarchy has, with Saudi help, overthrown the elected Muslim Brotherhood government. The oligarchy is trying to regain full authority over the country, despite outlawing and repressing the largest political party. The effort isn’t proceeding as smoothly as the Egyptian generals and Saudi princes planned.
Parts of the Brotherhood have broken away from the now underground movement and formed cells that attack security forces. Some have crossed into Libya or Syria to learn the trade and establish networks. They will return.
Tribes that have never cottoned to Cairo’s distant rule are asserting independence. In the west, near the Libyan border, they develop ties to ISIL, while in the east, the tribes of Sinai have made common cause with both al Qaeda and ISIL.
Egypt has not disintegrated but it will be preoccupied with internal problems for years to come.
Jordan
Israel has fought Jordan in 1948 and 1967, and all but annexed the West Bank which the UN once assigned to Jordan. Nonetheless, relations have been quite good in recent years, and Jordan is one of the few parts of Arab world where democracy is promising. Trade is good, borders are secure.
Jordan has pockets of Islamist ferment and terrorist actions occasionally strike security forces, and recent attacks suggest an uptick is underway. Militancy is based on Wahhabi mosques and clusters of veterans of the wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya and more recently, in Iraq and Syria. Preaching and telling war stories serve the same purpose.
Militancy is fueled by the country’s partnerships with Israel and the US. Israel continues to expand its settlements in Trans-Jordan (the West Bank) and tests the arrangements governing the Noble Sanctuary, or Temple Mount. The US invests in Jordan and aids its military in the ISIL War.
If Jordan were to face a serious Islamist threat, the result would be fragmentation and protracted internal war – another Syria. Israel would have lost a peaceful neighbor but there’s little likelihood that Jordan would be a conventional threat, only a border to be better patrolled.
Iran
Allies against Arab states, Israel and Iran became foes as Hisbollah rose and the common enemy, Saddam Hussein, fell. At times an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear sites seemed at hand, but the government’s eagerness was weakened by opposition from its own military and intelligence chiefs. (They may have had greater strategic vision than their prime minister.)
Iran’s nuclear program has been clamped down upon by a consensus of world powerholders – a rare thing today. Research on warhead designs and trigger mechanisms may continue, but without fissionable material.
Iran is weakened by events at home and abroad. Its chief ally, Syria, no longer exists. A Shia rump state along the Mediterranean will likely come about, but without the Sunnis in its army, it will never be as strong as it once was.
Internally Iran is beset by a reform movement centered in young urban cohorts who are vital to the country’s future. In the northwest, the Kurds wage a low-level insurgency for autonomy. Arabs and Baluchs so the same in the west and southeast, respectively.
Oil prices
Israeli security has benefited from the collapse of oil prices. World demand is not as strong as it once was. Fracking has greatly boosted American production and the technology is diffusing throughout the world. Alternative energy sources are being developed and put into operation. Though benchmarks are well off their lows of a few months ago, prices are expected to remain much lower than the $110/bbl of a few years ago.
The US and Israel will soon be exporting natural gas. Many importing countries will see them as more reliable and less politically objectionable than traditional sources in the Middle East and Russia.
Israel’s enemies, Arab and Persian, have relied on oil revenue for defense budgets and placating their subjects with generous disbursements. They also take part in, or finance, wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Exporting nations are tightening their belts, domestically and internationally. They have ominously large youth cohorts who face grim futures and increasingly look upon their rulers as decadent sybarites. Serious turmoil looms for most exporting nations, especially Saudi Arabia.
Middle-Eastern rulers have been more interested in personal power than in nation-building. Their downfalls and troubles have handed Israel a tremendous strategic windfall. Adjacent lands can only harbor guerrilla bands that can occasionally harass Israel. But that has been part of life since the sabras forged their settlements a century ago.
Saudi Arabia and its allied Gulf kingdoms pose the greatest threat, albeit a distant and perhaps unlikely one. The Saudis have already brought Egypt and its military – the best in the Arab world – into their sphere, and are trying to bring in the Sunni regions of Syria and Iraq – two more countries with strong military traditions.
Though budgetary concerns at home present limits on Saudi ambitions, the possibility of a Sunni league aligned against Israel, under Riyadh’s direction, is not implausible. Bureaus with greater strategic vision will see that, one day, Iran could be an important ally against the Sunnis, as it was for many decades.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.