Brian M Downing
The Islamist State is seeking to capitalize on its summer offensives in Syria and Iraq by establishing itself as the leader of Islamist militancy – this, at the expense of al Qaeda. Some militant groups, including the Pakistani Taliban, have sworn allegiance to IS, but thus far al Qaeda has not lost preeminence. This is surprising as IS’s accomplishments over the last two years dwarf those of the al Qaeda franchises, whose leaders are elderly orators hiding in Af-Pak villages and cities.
Taking a more active role in expanding its reach, IS sent a former Taliban fighter to Afghanistan. Mullah Abdul Rauf today has a number of orators and recruiters operating in Helmand province in the south – site of increased fighting between the Taliban and the Afghan army following the withdrawal of western forces last year. Spirits are high in IS, but Afghanistan will prove a difficult place to expand its influence.
The rank and file
Taliban fighters, as opposed to its leaders, are rarely religious zealots. Their understanding of Islam is alloyed with local rites and beliefs – something IS finds abhorrent if not heretical. Going back to the Russian war (1979-89), Afghan guerrillas found Arab jihadis haughty and condescending. The latter were largely educated urban dwellers and tended to see, and treat, local fighters as bumpkins. Afghan fighters also saw the jihadis as less than cautious in battle and were put off by their eagerness to die in battle. Religious affinities, then, are not strong.
Nor are Taliban fighters naive youths seeking adventure and honor in war. They fight less for lofty goals than for practical ones, chiefly ridding their districts of foreign intruders from the West and corrupt officials from Kabul. They are parts of levies raised by tribal elders and more concerned with modest rewards in the here and now than with pleasures in an afterlife or from a distant caliphate.
Taliban fighters today have been in battle for over a decade. The US and Northern Alliance drove them out of power in 2001 and they have been waging an insurgency ever since. Prior to that, Taliban fighters were engaged in a stalemated war with northern peoples. They are war weary more eager to return to their ravaged farms and depleted herds than to fight for a leader in Syria with a vision of uniting the Islamic world.
The leadership
During their short-lived emirate (1996-2001), Taliban leaders argued over the advisability of Afghanistan’s relationship with international Islamist causes. Should they aid foreign adventures such as those espoused and conducted by their “guest” Osama bin Laden, or should they content themselves with building Islamism at home? Many wanted al Qaeda out, but Mullah Omar overruled them. The events of September 11th led to ruin but the debate continues – and it bears on the issue of IS’s potential.
Some political and military leaders hold that hosting bin Laden had been catastrophic. It brought a powerful international coalition into the country and sent them packing for the mountains along the Pakistani border. Others hold the opposing view. The international invasion is clear evidence that the world is bent on stamping out Islamism. Hence for Islamism to succeed in their country, they must find strong allies abroad.
Debate on internationalism likely continues in the Taliban shuras, the minutes of which of course are not known. It is thought, however, that the older political and military leaders are less attracted to internationalism than younger ones. However, the long years of skirmishes and targeted killings have killed off many older, more pragmatic leaders, allowing the younger and more internationalist leaders to rise to prominence.
Regardless of the Taliban leaders’ stances on internationalism, they are unlikely to suffer rivals to their power. IS recruiters and IS itself pose a threat to the organizational integrity of the Taliban, especially at such an auspicious time when most foreign troops are out of the country or at least out of combat operations. Mullah Omar is thought to still have supreme authority within the Taliban movement, and his disposition is unknown. However, reports of sharp engagements in Helmand province between Taliban bands and IS advocates suggests substantial animosity.
Eastern Afghanistan and Waziristan
The Islamic State will find greater affinities with the assortment of international-oriented bands operating in the mountainous eastern provinces of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal regions. Numerous bands operate there, teach each other deadly skills and tactics, and collaborate on each other’s operations. The Punjabis, Pashtuns, Kashmiris, Uzbeks, and Uighurs straddling the Af-Pak frontier are as international in composition and outlook as IS could hope for.
However, IS will face organizational resistance here as well. First, the area is home to several hundred al Qaeda fighters, who have survived despite years of American and international efforts to eradicate them. Despite IS’s conquests in the Middle East, the AQ fighters have remained loyal to their longstanding leadership. The AQ leaders are of course determined to keep their control of international jihadism as much as possible.
Second, many of the groups, including Lashkar-i-Taiba and al Qaeda itself, are tied to the Pakistani military and intelligence services. The Pakistani generals will not welcome any rival for influence over the motley bands straddling the frontier. They are instrumental in advancing the generals’ aspirations to gain control of Kashmir, reduce Indian influence in Afghanistan, and inspire support at home. The generals will seek to kill off IS interlopers should they seek to recruit at Pakistan’s expense.
IS influence in the lawless areas of Af-Pak would put greater pressure on Pakistan to conduct ground operations against them. Pakistan’s increasingly important benefactor, China, may be among the most aggressive advocates. Beijing is beset by a low-level insurgency in its western province, where in recent months Muslim Uighurs have become more active and deadly. Uighurs are exfiltrating China, often through Vietnam, and serving with Islamist groups from Syria to Afghanistan, presumably before returning to fight in western China – or “East Turkistan” as they call it. The Pakistani generals will be loth to conduct ground operations in those areas, as they would entail heavy casualties and the loss of useful Islamist allies.
IS’s efforts in Afghanistan are unlikely to meet with success with the Taliban or the Islamist groups along the rugged Af-Pak border. They may do better in the Middle East where mythic understandings of war are stronger and organizational walls are weaker. IS may soon see the reservoir of mythic ideas of war drained by a protracted and bloody war of attrition whose relation to Islam is increasingly dubious, even to naive boys.
Brian M Downing is a political-military analyst, author of The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam, and co-author with Danny Rittman of The Samson Heuristic. He can be reached at brianmdowning@gmail.com.
(Copyright 2015 Brian M Downing)
http://www.worldtribune.com/archives/isil-looks-afghanistan-faces-resistance-taliban-pakistan-china/
jan 26 2015