Brian M Downing
The Islamic State offensive in Iraq has been blunted, but forming an effective counteroffensive has proved elusive. That will first require a political agreement among the antagonistic Shia, Kurdish, and Sunni peoples. The Sunnis are only about 15% of Iraq’s population, they are despised by the others, yet they are the only ones capable of defeating IS inside the country.
The Shia government has given two key portfolios to Sunni politicians. This belated effort at inclusiveness is unlikely to ease sectarian tensions or encourage the Sunnis to fight ISIL. The enmity is too strong, and it is worsening. The optimal way to fight IS entails granting autonomy to the Sunnis of central and western Iraq.
Sectarian enmity
Many Sunnis support ISIL attacks on the Shia, some even fight alongside it. Blame for this is laid at the feet of former prime minister Nuri al-Maliki who pursued exclusionary efforts, despite US warnings. Historians will describe Maliki as one of the country’s less gifted politicians, but the enmity is deeply embedded in the country. It will not be eased by a few seats in government and hearty handshakes at a photo op. Nor are differences being put aside to face a common danger.
It’s well known that the Sunnis dominated Iraq since the British installed them in power after World War I. But it isn’t all distant history. Saddam fought the Kurds, who acted in concert with Iran during the long war in the 1980s. He even used chemical weapons on them. His fist also came down hard on the Shias, many of whom served in Iran-backed militias. After the First Gulf War (1991), Saddam massacred over a hundred thousand Shias.
The Shias and Kurds do not see these as distant events or as the actions of a deranged tyrant; they were the acts of Sunni oppression. In the eyes of the Kurds and Shias, that minority is now collaborating with ISIL to regain mastery of Iraq.
The Sunnis view Saddam’s 2003 ouster as leading to an inversion of a natural social order and to murderous sectarian fighting aimed at intimidating them, if not driving them into exile. Furthermore, it has delivered Iraq into the hands of the age-old “Persian” enemy and threatens to expand Shia rule throughout the Middle East, from Lebanon to Yemen and Iran. Significantly, this view is shared by the Sunni powers in the region, including Saudi Arabia.
The Sunnis and ISIL
Sunnis, especially former members of Saddam’s army and state, have aided ISIL in the last few years, from the bombing campaign against Shia targets to the bold offensive of last June. Sunnis serve along side ISIL fighters, convinced Sunni troops top desert around Mosul, and were rewarded with administrative posts in towns that Baghdad lost control of.
Sheikh Ali Hatem al Solemn, leader of the largest Sunni tribal confederation, has announced his willingness to fight IS: “Tribal forces are capable of eliminating terrorists…. We’ve done it before, we can do it again.” Little more than a few skirmishes have come – and for reasons not long to seek.
Rather than bringing unity, the ISIL offensive is worsening hostility toward the Sunnis. Kurdish troops have used the IS offensive as an excuse to seize Sunni oil fields and drive out Sunni residents. Shia troops have done the same in the few towns they’ve been able to retake. Shia militias have massacred hundreds of Sunnis, though the full-scale sectarian fighting of a few years ago has not yet returned. Nonetheless, Sunni fears of being driven out of their country persist.
Recognizing that Shia and Kurdish troops are neither willing nor able to drive IS from central Iraq, the Sunni tribes know well that they will bear the brunt of the fighting. Their casualties will be high, many cities will be leveled, and ISIL reprisals will be horrific. A victory will leave Sunni Iraq gravely weakened and vulnerable to more inroads by Kurds and Shias. Casualties and emigration will reduce their voting weight in national affairs.
Sunni autonomy
This isn’t an environment conducive to sectarian reconciliation. Portfolios and handshakes in Baghdad mean little. Sunnis judge that continuing as part of Iraq means further marginalization and that autonomy along the lines enjoyed by Kurdistan is more desirable – and within reach.
The Sunnis want arms, guarantees of autonomy, and a larger share of oil revenue for their effort against IS. However, Baghdad sees an armed and autonomous region as a large step toward independence followed by alignment with Saudi Arabia in the latter’s anti-Shia strategy. In that Riyadh has been encouraging Sunni resistance against the Shias, these concerns are well-founded. An autonomous west would become a buffer between the Shia of Iraq and Iran to the east and the Shia of Lebanon and Syria to the west.
Washington also prefers to see Iraq remain unified; a fragmented country portends more instability in the region. Many will see paradox here as Washington brought so much instability with the 2003 invasion, including the virtual independence of Kurdistan.
The Sunnis are the only group that can defeat ISIL in Iraq. Their fighters are capable of engaging jihadi fighters in every city and along every road. Further, in that the principal tribal confederation extends into eastern Syria, they are capable of fighting ISIL there too. Their tribal networks are gathering intelligence now.
The boundaries of the region are breaking apart, from Libya to Syria to Yemen. An orderly devolution of power to a Sunni Iraq will present less instability than a likely protracted war with ISIL followed by a war of Sunni independence. And it will bring a critical defeat for ISIL before it can gain thousands of fresh recruits, win the allegiance of kindred militant groups in and out of the region, and convince the Sunnis of Anbar that they will fare better as a part of its empire than as a part of Shia Iraq.
Brian M Downing is a military analyst, author of The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: Social Change from the Great War to Vietnam, and co-author with Danny Rittman of The Samson Heuristic.
Copyright 2014 Brian M Downing