Brian M Downing
The US and Britain, along with Kurdish-Arab SDF allies, have established themselves in eastern Syria. Washington and Riyadh are discussing a contingent from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. President Trump recently said the US would soon be out of Syria. The statement has been dialed back since then and it might have been intended to bait the Sunni powers into putting some of their own troops into danger.
SDF troops are reducing the remaining ISIL positions – an effort that would be proceeding more quickly had many Kurds not left to counter the Turks near Afrin. SDF forces are intended to stay in eastern Syria to prevent Damascus from retaking it and to block the Shia Corridor connecting Tehran with its Syrian and Hisbollah allies.
Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman may be directing Saudi troops to take up positions astride the Corridor. This presents risks and opportunities for the ambitious future king. Youth ignores risk.
Risks
The Kingdom has two separate armies – one drawn from the general population and a second comprising tribal guard units. The arrangement is designed to prevent too much power in the military and of course to make a coup less likely. Military takeovers, after all, are the prime source of jarring political change in the region, especially those that depose monarchs.
Saudi units are well-equipped and march smartly but are nonetheless unprofessional and inexperienced. An officer attains his post not through abilities and exams but rather through connections and relations. This is plain to enlisted personnel and junior officers, who will face higher casualties because of patronage.
Saudi troops are unaccustomed to hardship. Training is lax. They patrol safe areas in southern Yemen and only rarely skirmish with Houthis along the frontier in the north. War is known mainly through family lore from the 1920s when Abdul Aziz defeated the Rashidis and Hashemites. Deployment, especially if followed by casualties, stalemate, and reversals, may bring opposition from scores of half-brothers and cousins who resent their lesser positions in the army and state and already oppose bin Salman’s ascendance,
Saudi units in eastern Syria may be tested by Syrian and Iranian troops who want to open the Shia Corridor and make Riyadh pay a price in the sectarian war, which it has thus far diligently avoided. Neither Shia army has demonstrated great effectiveness in battle, but they have more experience than any Saudi unit. The Saudis, however, will have American air support and hostile troop concentrations make excellent targets.
Involvement in Syria will be a drain on the Kingdom’s already strained finances. Not only will Riyadh be supporting its own forces, but in all likelihood it will have to help fund the SDF and build an economy and state.
Opportunities
Campaigns in Syria may bring success in the conflict with Iran. Military and economic communication lines between Iran and its allies will be blocked. The creation of a Sunnistan in eastern Syria, and perhaps in western Iraq as well, will solidify the strategic block and bring a new state into the Saudi sphere. It already comprises other Gulf monarchies, Egypt, and Jordan. This Sunnistan could one day align with Kurdistan.
This would bring tremendous power prestige to the callow Mohammad bin Salman. Critics in Saudi society and rivals in the royal family would become even quieter and his mastery of throne and realm would be assured. Saudi kings would no longer appear to live in the embarrassing shadow of American protectionism.
Predecessors over the last 60 years have been known for largesse with petrodollars. The new king would be known for success in war – the soundest basis of legitimacy. Stories and images of the prince as leader of men in wars to the north would abound, almost certainly in exaggerated, mythic forms. Mohammad bin Salman would be the first warrior king to rule the Kingdom since Abdul Aziz died in 1953. Perhaps this vision is shaping his strategic planning more than he knows.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.