Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war placed it firmly in the Shia camp with Iran, Syria, Hisbollah, and to some extent Iraq. The move places Russia firmly at odds with the Sunni camp of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the Gulf monarchies.
Putin’s move seems to be a blunder, inserting Russia into a civil war and closing off or at least endangering trade and diplomacy with the Sunni world. The Russian president, however, has demonstrated considerable adroitness in the Crimea and Ukraine, and few observers see him as inspiring great trust. His Shia policy may not be enduring, and a timely shift may be in the cards.
Problems with Shia alignment
Numerous problems arise from standing in the Shia camp. The Sunni world is vastly more populous than the Shia one, outnumbering them by at least four to one. The Sunni world is a large and growing world marketplace and though Russia’s hydrocarbons hold little attraction, its armaments do. They are less expensive than western counterparts, come with no human rights strings, and were finding eager buyers as the monarchies tried to distance themselves from the US.
The Saudis are threatening Russian oil export markets in Eastern Europe, offering Poland crude at discounted prices. With fewer oil and arms purchasers, the Russian economy will suffer tremendously. Putin’s high polling data will as well.
Russia’s commitment in Syria risks becoming deeper and open-ended. The Sunnis and the US can escalate their support to rebel groups, with little if any risk to their own personnel. This could one day force Russia to send more aircraft, possibly ground troops. The cycle can repeat itself.
Fifteen percent of the Russian population is Sunni Muslim. They are grumbling over Moscow’s support for Shiism. Muslims in the Russian Caucasus have fought insurgencies against Moscow and significant numbers of them fight along with al Qaeda and ISIL against the Shia-Alawi troops. In time, the fighters will return to Russia, perhaps after receiving financial inducements from Sunni states.
Political economy and national security, then, argue for avoiding confinement in the Shia camp. Better to maintain good relations with both sides of the sectarian divide. China is successfully doing so, buying oil from Saudi Arabia and Iran, selling arms and other goods to both. The US is trying to follow suit.
Volte face?
Putin seeks to increase Russia’s power in the world, not restrict it by siding with what in world terms is a sect within a vast religion. He may be positioned to execute a skillful move that will retain good relations with the Shias and at least mollify the Sunnis.
1. Russia will prevail upon Shia allies in Tehran and Damascus to abandon any notion of reconquering the territory that was Syria a few years ago. it is highly unlikely they can do that with Russia’s full support; it is impossible without it, save for the improbable scenario of a large Iranian ground force battling for years.
2. Objectives will be limited to reestablishing control over a Shia-Alawi region from Aleppo to Damascus. Russian airpower and advisers will concentrate on this region and refrain from others, limiting the capacity of allies. Russia will vow to defend this region and punish any threats to it by massed rebel troops.
3. Russia can win back a measure of favor from Sunni powers by insisting that Assad steps down and leaves the country. Saudi Arabia insists on it; Iran insists he must stay.
4. Iran dearly wants a land corridor connecting Tehran and Baghdad with Damascus and Beirut. This is presently broken by ISIL and a slew of rebel groups. Russia will disabuse Iran of regaining the corridor, effectively ceding the region to Sunni powers or leaving it as a lawless region.
In short, the Shias get a region from the Mediterranean to Aleppo and south to Damascus – a rump state but a defensible one. The Sunnis get Assad’s departure and a greatly weakened Shia state without communicate lines to Iran.
Russia, in turn, gets credit for an adroit military and diplomatic move that establishes two military bases in the region, Tartus and Latakia. The door is open to renewed arms sales to Sunni monarchies and to future collaboration on oil prices by two of the largest exporters.
©2015 Brian M Downing