Brian M Downing
IS-K was lying low for the last few years. It set up cells in Afghanistan in 2015, comprising mostly Pakistani militants, hoping the success of ISIL, its parent unit in the Levant, would attract jihadis from throughout Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. The new franchise would conquer large parts of central Asia. It didn’t happen. IS-K attracted two or three thousand fighters at best, most of whom hide out in eastern Afghanistan.
When the Kabul government collapsed last August, IS-K stepped up. It struck the Kabul airport, killing Americans, civilians, and Taliban soldiers. It subsequently bombed Jalalabad, Kunduz, and Kandahar. The last two attacks were on Shia mosques. The aim is clear: incite sectarian fighting to break down Taliban rule, coalesce jihadis across the region, and conquer a new caliphate. What are the prospects for undermining Taliban rule? What would come of it?
Civil war ideology
IS-K, ISIL, and al Qaeda all have “Phoenix out of the ashes” in their background assumptions. Civil war breaks down the order, increases the power of disciplined jihadis, and brings the new day. Apocalypse now, caliphate tomorrow.
Marxist thought too has a millenarian belief as contradictions in capitalism lead to proletarian revolution. Many forms of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam prophesize decisive battles between good and evil, usually quite bloody, which usher in a glorious epoch.
Iraq is a template of sorts. After Saddam Hussein’s Sunni government was replaced by a Shia one, al Qaeda bombed a revered Shia mosque in Karbala which greatly intensified sectarian hatreds. Civil war erupted, al Qaeda prospered, though not for long. Sunni allies turned against them. AQ in Iraq of course became ISIL whose fortunes have come and gone in Iraq and Syria.
Redux in Afghanistan?
IS-K is advancing its millenarian agenda in Afghanistan, where the population is 80% Sunni, 20% Shia. It’s highly unlikely to succeed. The Hazara Shia are disliked, marginalized, but not hated. There was no jarring shift in power to them, as was the case in Iraq. Most Afghans have no wish to see them brutalized by anyone, let alone by a murderous militant group.
Nor is there much likelihood that IS-K will attract many other jihadi groups in the region. Al Qaeda is tied to the Taliban and Pakistan. The Baluchs are focused on separatism not caliphate. Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-i-Mohammed are interested in India and Kashmir. The Uighur are fixed on their homeland in Xinjiang and their oppressors in Beijing.
IS-K attacks on the Shia may nonetheless cause trouble for the Taliban. The government is sharply divided between ideologues and pragmatists. The former see the Shia as apostates deserving of death, the latter want to ease internal conflicts, present a better face to the outside world, and prevent dismay in Iran. The Taliban will have to allocate troops and money to hunt down IS-K and protect vulnerable people from their violence. Countermeasures will be burdensome on the shaky, cash-strapped government.
The Shia may form self-defense units in the mountainous regions in the central region where they are concentrated. Many of them served in Iranian-backed militias in Syria and are coming home. This could lead to Tajiks, Uzbeks, and hostile Pashtun tribes to protect themselves as well. One good thing about an army that disintegrates is that it leaves behind a lot of trained soldiers and weapons.
© 2021Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.