Is conflict with Iran coming, again?
Brian M Downing
Throughout the campaign Donald Trump criticized his chief adversary for supporting the Iranian nuclear deal of 2015. The president-elect has backtracked on several matters, including prosecuting Hillary Clinton and building a physical wall along the Mexican border.
Trump has not stepped back from his opposition to Iran. His national security team comprises many figures who are harsh critics of the nuclear deal and see Iran as the most important state sponsor of terrorism. Many are retired generals who do not place military action far down the list of options. And of course the Israeli Right, which wields considerable influence in both US parties, has been hostile to Iran and eager for an attack for many years.
What’s afoot with this renewed hostility toward Iran which despite provocative acts in the Gulf and eliding missile-test strictures, has abided by the nuclear deal? If conflict is coming, how far might it go?
Attack
Over the years, attacks on centrifuges at Fordo and Natanz, the breeder reactor at Arak, and the Parchin research site often seemed imminent. Sabres rattled, carriers crossed the Hormuz Strait. Centrifuges and the breeder reactor are being dismantled and the Parchin site mysteriously exploded in late 2014.
Attacking Iran now would only demonstrate America’s unwillingness to abide by international agreements and norms – especially to key US allies. Further, a buildup of assets in and around Iran would lead to a swift response from Iran’s protector-in-chief, Russia.
Vladimir Putin would speed up installation of, and perhaps deploy troops to operate, the sophisticated air defense system recently sold to Iran. Ship-killing cruise missiles could be deployed to positions along the Gulf where they could gravely endanger American ships, even aircraft carriers. Russian fighters could deploy to Iranian airfields as they recently did to strike targets in Syria. Iranians, it’s well known, do not cotton to foreign military presences on their land, but neither do they welcome being attacked by American bombs and missiles. Russian jets would be greeted, though cautiously.
A strong Russian response is inevitable. It would force an embarrassing American retreat. Iran would retaliate, both in and out of the region. Other goals must be in mind.
Destabilization
A less sensational goal would be to destabilize Iran. Many countries in the region – Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen – have broken apart along sectarian and ethnic lines. Iran could, with foreign support, share the same fate.
The new administration could, in conjunction with largely dormant Israeli and Saudi efforts, support insurgencies inside the Islamic Republic. In the northwest, the Kurds have been waging a low-level insurgency against Persian rule. Similarly, in the southeast, the Baloch people are battling Tehran’s control.
Government control will not be shaken off easily. The IRGC retains considerable repressive capacity. Any American-Israeli-Saudi effort will have a long-term goal of consuming Tehran’s finances and wearing down IRGC troops, who are already suffering sharp casualties in Syria. Discontent with the government will increase and shape public opinion in coming years, though probably not as adversely for the mullahs and generals as Washington think tanks might forecast.The result is less likely to be strengthening reformism and liberal change than solidifying repression and theocratic militarism.
Support from Sunni powers
Confrontation with Iran will attract support from Saudi Arabia and other Sunni monarchies. The latter fear Iranian-Shia power which now stretches, if tenuously, from Lebanon to Iran and see their Shia minorities, if dubiously, as fifth columns with growing ties to the IRGC.
The Sunni princes are reluctant to use their own lavishly-equipped but lethargic militaries. They would dearly love to see the US do the heavy lifting. The princes have two levers to use on Washington.
First, the US is eager to retain influence in the Gulf and is concerned over the rift that developed with Sunni powers from calls for political reform and the Iranian nuclear deal. The princes have expressed their disdain by warming to Russia and China, implying that American hegemony in the Gulf may be greatly weakened in coming years, and looking further ahead, replaced by geopolitical rivals in Moscow and Beijing.
Second, the Sunni powers buy immense amounts of military equipment from the US and NATO allies. Saudi Arabia alone is the world’s third largest arms purchaser. Losing these markets would be painful for the US economy. Tens of thousands of well-paid manufacturing jobs would be lost. No president, regardless of his relation to the business world, can risk such losses.
Confronting Iran, then, is unlikely to lead to direct strikes on Iranian soil. More likely it will lead to support for insurgents and other efforts to weaken the government. Further, and perhaps more importantly, it will secure America’s position in the Gulf and its sales of weaponry in the region. American globalism and political economy all but mandate it.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.