Brian M Downing
Overt Iranian intervention?
Tehran is deeply concerned that events in Iraq will lead to Saudi and American gains along its western border, parts of which have low-level insurgencies. Its only major military ally in the region, Syria, has come out on top in the civil war but its cities are in ruins and its population will be rent by sectarian hostility for decades. Iran sees itself as endangered.
Tehran is supporting the Iraqi government’s harsh repression and may be preparing to intervene if it collapses. Iran may calculate that if it does not, the Saudis, US, and their proxies will rush in. This is unlikely but governments prepare for many contingencies and adversaries can misread preparations as signs of imminent action.
An Iranian incursion into Iraqi land, if only to establish a defensive glacis, would trigger a response. Saudi Arabia would be greatly alarmed. It knows, however, that its military cannot take on Iran, even with its GCC allies.
Iran would face two possible responses. Occupation of eastern Iraq would naturally bring on spontaneous domestic opposition from Sunnis and anti-Iranian Shias. Both groups have experience in guerrilla warfare and urban combat. They would enjoy financial support from the Saudis et al and safe havens in Anbar.
The US response would ordinarily be predictable – airstrikes, troops movements, perhaps a sizable buildup and direct countermoves. However, President Trump’s reaction cannot be reliably predicted. His instinct to disengage from the region conflicts with personal belligerence.
This opens the door to an Iranian blunder. Tehran may see Trump’s stepping back from attacking Iran last summer as a sign he would not respond vigorously to an incursion into Iraq. Furthermore, Tehran may see Trump at odds with his generals and distracted by impeachment proceedings. But Iran would not act without form Russian backing and the view from Moscow might be more cautious than the one from Tehran.
ISIL
There might be another winner from Iraq’s turmoil. As Baghdad becomes increasingly paralyzed, ISIL may be able to emerge from its underground networks in western Iraq and eastern Syria, then retake towns and districts in the Sunni province of Anbar.
ISIL thrives where governments are weak. If Iraq breaks apart, as suggested here for many years, the transition to three or four successor states will not come about smoothly. Coalition governments will be only somewhat easier to cobble together than recent ones in Baghdad. Look at the Kurdish north where ethnic homogeneity did not supersede political and tribal rivalries, not even in the face of Turkish and Iraqi invasion.
While there are parts of Iraq that are overwhelmingly Sunni or Shia, many parts have large numbers of both sects. This is especially so in the central region, including Baghdad. ISIL could increase its underground presence in central towns and cities, presenting itself as defending the Sunnis from Shia and “Persian” oppression.
Saudi Arabia has been trying to gain influence with ISIL and al Qaeda for years. The position here has long been that Riyadh supported the Sunni insurgency against the US, including AQ fighters. It did so to keep them from striking inside the kingdom and channel them into fighting the Shias in Iraq and Iran. Elsewhere Saudi aid has been going to the AQ franchise in Syria and ISIL cells in Afghanistan.
This underscores the ruthlessness and deceitfulness of Saudi Arabia and the deepening turmoil of the entire region. It also underscores the view here that as the region’s oil becomes less important in the world, and in the absence of any cultural affinities, the US should lessen its positions in the Gulf and abandon the quixotic idea that it can bring democracy or even stability there.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.