Brian M Downing
Unrest is spreading across many parts of the world. The most violent case might be Iraq where a large youth population is calling for reforms and enduring high casualties for it. Prominent in their demands is a call for the end of Iranian meddling in the country’s affairs. Several Iranian diplomatic buildings have been torched.
Iran has had considerable influence in Iraq dating back to the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s and increasing sharply after 2003. However, there are other countries, in and out of the Gulf, that also meddle inside Iraq – Saudi Arabia foremost among them. The protesters’ concentration on Iran is unusual. It offers insights into the regional nature of the crisis in Iraq and potential outcomes.
Iranian influence, American influence
Iran helped build Shia movements and militias inside Iraq during the long, bitter war of the 1980s. Indeed, the influence probably predates the war. Similarly, Iraq has sought influence in Iran’s Khuzestan province which is home to substantial oil resources and a large Arab population. The greatest boon to Iranian influence came not from Tehran’s resourcefulness but from Washington’s foolishness. Ousting the Sunni government in 2003 and fostering Shia-majority rule allowed Shia movements to move from underground networks to open parts of the political process.
Despite their blunders in Iraq, Neoconservatives decry Iranian influence. They also exaggerate it. Shia governments have awarded oil tracts to US firms, bought arms from US manufacturers, and hired US contractors to train the military. When al Qaeda began to reemerge in Anbar, American counterterrorism teams were invited in. And when ISIL took over the north, the call went to Washington. Tehran must have been livid.
Why Iran?
Demonstrators are focusing far more on Iranian influence than on the US’s, which is at least as high. IRGC officers stand with several Shia militias, but US advisers are with Iraqi army troops, especially its elite forces, and about 5,000 GIs are present. That figure is down from the 180,000 of ten years ago when Iraqis were fighting a protracted insurgency. And of course anti-American sentiment is extremely high in Iraq and the entire region. Nonetheless, the anti-American dogs aren’t barking.
The demonstrations reflect widespread anger at the political system but they are shaped by a power struggle within Iraq’s Shia. The Shia might be expected to show considerable unity after years of Sunni oppression but Saddam, a Sunni, was able to maintain his control by playing off Shia factions against one another. Though a majority, and in power, the Shia are deeply divided by tribal loyalties, political parties, and antagonistic leaders.
Stable coalitions are hard to come by. Elections lead to interminable discussions and heated threats. Indeed, left to their own, Shia parties would never be able to form a government. Foreign pressures had to come into play – often from Iran, leading to resentments from those excluded. Today, they are using politics by other means.
Enter Sadr (and Mohammed bin Salman)
One of the more ambitious Shia leaders is Moqtada al Sadr, scion of a distinguished clerical family and former leader of militias fighting the US. American intelligence has long viewed him as loyal to Iran but he’s viewed here as an opportunist. He fled to Iran at the height of the insurgency but meets with Saudi leaders. He isn’t seeking sectarian harmony.
Two years ago he parleyed in Riyadh with Mohammed bin Salman, scion of the Saudi royal family. Upon returning to Iraq his rank and file began an anti-Iran program. Tehran’s consulate in Basra was destroyed. The program has escalated sharply in recent weeks into a powerful, destabilizing movement. The term quid pro quo is popular today and one was likely arranged in Riyadh two years ago.
Sadr stands to gain power in Iraq, if only a greatly weakened and perhaps fragmented one. His party could become the most important in the assembly and he could use his militias to replace the wobbly government altogether, becoming an authoritarian leader with a religious patina, like the one in Saudi Arabia – and in league with it too.
MBS stands to gain more. Iranian influence would be weakened in an adjacent state and democracy would be destroyed root and branch in the region Riyadh feels destined to dominate. Iraq, though, may cease to exist as a unified state, breaking apart into a Kurdish north, a Sunni west, a Shia south around Basra, and a tumultuous central region around Baghdad with an illustrious past but a violent present and bleak future.
MBS might be able to have cordial ties with the Shia south, as long as it remains authoritarian and anti-Iran. He could seek to strengthen his position by detaching the Sunnis and Kurds of eastern Syria away from Damascus. American troops are already occupying the land and its oil fields.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.