Iraqi forces after Ramadi

ISIL took Ramadi last May, after swiftly overwhelming the Iraqi troops there. Now, seven months later, the Iraqi army has retaken most of the city. What does the battle tell us about the current capacities of Iraqi forces?

Unimpressive performance

Despite overwhelming numerical superiority and relentless air support, the Iraqi army was unable to retake a medium-sized city a hundred miles from Baghdad for several months. Problems remain with unit cohesion, logistics, organizational capacity, and trust in superiors.

Ramadi was retaken by better units brought in from various parts of the country, not by troops stationed in eastern Anbar province. The latter evidently cannot be relied upon for sustained combat operations, especially against disciplined fighters such as ISIL troops.

Prime minister Abadi’s reform efforts have been rebuffed by parliament, most of whose members are deeply integrated into graft networks. We cannot expect the Iraqi army to professionalize. It is doubtful that it can defeat ISIL without considerable help from Shia militias, Kurdish peshmerga, and Sunni tribal units.

Morale boost?

The army as a whole hasn’t received a boost in morale, though Baghdad has issued photos and clips of spirited soldiers joyfully raising their weapons in victory. The troops look suspiciously tidy and rested. The events look staged, as do most depictions of the Syrian army.

The units that are taking Ramadi are enduring high casualties, perhaps very high casualties. Baghdad will not be forthcoming with accurate numbers. The units will require several months off the line to get back to full strength.

Shia militias

There is conflicting evidence on the presence of Shia militias, as recent reports claim militiamen are now wearing regular army units – a sign less of organizational integration than of official deception. Shia militias were important in blunting ISIL probes toward Baghdad in 2014 and in retaking Tikrit. However, they were abusive toward Sunni civilians which may be leading to support for ISIL from wary Sunnis already hostile to Shia authority.

Furthermore, the US is concerned that because Shia militias are tied to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, they may be more loyal to Tehran than to Baghdad. Wherever their loyalties lie, the strength of militias augurs poorly for coherent governance in coming months or years.

The next city

Mosul is often said to be the next objective of the Iraqi army. The northern city will have to be assaulted one day, but it will probably not be in the near future. Mosul is too large and too well defended. Further, its population is thought to have a measure of support for ISIL and a deep hostility toward Baghdad and Shiism.

Taking Mosul will require large numbers of effective troops, including Shia militias and Kurdish peshmerga, which will call for organization synchronization and political deals with the Kurds.

Retaking Mosul will entail very high casualties. This could prove ruinous for the frail army, bringing desertion, disintegration, and protracted reluctance to engage in future operations.

Fallujah is a more probable objective. It is smaller than Ramadi and greatly smaller than Mosul. Fallujah lies roughly halfway between Ramadi and Baghdad, and is already cut off from most of ISIL.

(Coming Thursday: ISIL after Ramadi)

^©2015 Brian M Downing