Iranian militarism and the coming elections
Brian M Downing
It was once hoped that the Iran nuclear deal would lead to less hostility between the US and Iran and to an easing of the mullahs’ and generals’ authoritarian rule. Months prior to the signing of the deal, however, Iranian leaders and their media outlets became increasingly hostile to the US. At times it seemed that the deal was dead.
Hostility has worsened in recent months and Iran has moved closer to Russia, installing a sophisticated Russian air defense system and allowing Russian jets to use an Iranian field to strike targets in Syria, at least for a while. Iran has violated missile testing agreements, hanged dozens of opponents, and announced it would form military units to fight overseas. In recent days the IRGC has begun a new round of sending naval vessels dangerously close to American ships. The reasons are related to political processes, in both the US and Iran.
US resolve, US elections?
There’s nothing new in these Iranian actions. They have gone on for years dating back to the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. The recent uptick of incidents is part of a larger effort, in conjunction with key allies, to probe US resolve and possibly weary the American public of global commitments and costly defense budgets. China probes in East and Southeast Asia, Russia in the Baltic, the Ukraine, and Syria. Iran does its part in the Gulf.
The three Eurasian powers might also seek to influence the American elections, helping Donald Trump by augmenting the perception that the Democrats have allowed the world to become more dangerous. Though Trump’s precise foreign policy is neither knowable nor in all likely formulated, and could entail a far stronger response than anything previous administrations would risk, Beijing and Moscow might see a President Trump as a clumsy outsider, who is unmindful of subtleties and likely to cause egregious damage to partnerships in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. On this the Eurasian powers will find agreement from many American foreign policy hands.
Militarism and Iranian politics
Iranian actions in the Gulf and elsewhere are more closely tied to their own elections. Several governments in the region have been toppled by popular uprisings or fallen into civil war. Others are loth to win popular support through democratic reforms and seek support through military feats. The Saudi princes display themselves as leading bold campaigns in Yemen and Syria. The Assad government has managed to present itself as defending Shia and Christian Syrians from Sunni extremists.
Iranian mullahs and generals are playing the same cards with their public. They are defending the nation from ISIL, Saudi Arabia, and the United States – three entities with significant ties in Tehran’s narratives. Political change, the Iranian elite suggest, is not advisable in the face of such threats. Nor is dissent. Voices of reform weaken the nation and reveal vulnerabilities to enemies.
This does not augur well for presidential elections next spring. Criticism of the leadership will be condemned as sedition and probably quashed. Even the limited reforms of President Rouhani might not be in keeping with the times. He might be challenged by a more conservative figure, possibly an IRGC general such as Qasim Suleimani who domestic media present as valiantly rolling back terrorism from Syria to Iraq to the nation’s gates. Suleimani or someone like him may win by hook or by crook.
Dangers of Militarism
A country winning legitimacy by the sword, or the brandishing of one, raises the possibility of starting a regional conflagration. This is unlikely because of the military weakness of most Gulf powers, none of which, not even Saudi Arabia, could risk an all out war with as large a country as Iran.
Iran and the US have already clashed occasionally going back to the Iran-Iraq War when the US sank Iranian gunboats and inadvertently shot down an Iranian airliner. The risk of war, however, is low as Iran cannot match American air and naval assets, China has no assets in the region, and Moscow has very few. Skirmishes serve Iran’s purposes, war will not.
Iranian militarism may be counterproductive domestically should the Syrian war disappoint. The Shia government cannot regain control of the country and will be consigned, by military realities or any likely settlement, to the western region, leaving the rest of the country to Sunni enemies and Saudi intrigues. Iranians, after years of IRGC cant, will be left with an unsatisfying conclusion, unsettlingly high casualties, and a restless young population.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.