Brian M Downing
Donald Trump came to office four years ago determined to gravely weaken Iran. He promptly withdrew from the JCPOA and imposed harsh sanctions. At times airstrikes seemed imminent. His foreign policy, however, was erratic, incoherent, and unsuccessful, whether toward Iran, Venezuela, N Korea, or even China. All four have emerged without serious damage. Some are all the stronger.
Many in the US government feel relations with Iran can improve. Are the mullahs and generals weaker or stronger now? What are the prospects for rapprochement with the US? What are Iran’s plans for the region?
Embattled nation
Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has faced continuous wars, both hot and cold. In 1980, amid the American hostage situation, Iraq invaded, seeking to take hold of strategic waterways and boost its prestige in the Arab world. Many Sunni monarchies supported Iraq, though not at first. Once Iraq’s offensive bogged down, however, the princes needed to prevent an Iranian-Shia victory so close to home. (It might be noted that had Iran not seized the US embassy and broken with Washington, Iraq would never have dared invade.)
The war dragged on for eight years and the Islamic Republic suffered at least 400,000 deaths. Though the war was a draw, Iran repelled the invaders and lost no territory. In an effort to gain influence with both sides, the US gave aid to both states but got only enmity from both.
In 2003 the US invaded Iraq, ousted the government, and threatened to turn its attention to Iran. Tehran, through Swiss intermediaries, requested to begin a dialog, including discussion of its nuclear program. Secretary of State Powell was interested but the White House rejected talks out of hand. Iran set Shia militias against US and coalition forces and a bloody insurgency followed. Though details elude us at present, American threats to Iran and Shia attacks on GIs simultaneously trailed off – suggestive of a deal. In Tehran’s estimation, it had another success.
Iran signed the JCPOA in 2015. It seemed to augur better ties with the US, but the mullahs and generals opposed it. Their rhetoric before and after the deal was deeply hostile to the US, perhaps because they were convinced that anti-Iranian positions were entrenched in Washington.
Two years later Trump quit the JCPOA and imposed tough sanctions. He probably supported Saudi and Israel assassinations and bombings inside Iran. He held back, however, from strikes on Iran – in part because of Pentagon reluctance, in part because of cautious dilettantism. Trump is gone and Iran prides itself on another win.
Authoritarian rule strengthened
American policymakers often claim they want democracy for Iran. The sincerity of the claim can be disputed, the outcome of the policy cannot. Authoritarianism in Tehran has not flagged. It’s probably stronger.
The mullahs and generals have emerged from conflicts over the last forty years victorious and lionized. The Islamic Republic, like the Soviet Union in 1945, has become more popular and legitimate than it could have without wars. Stalin defended Russia and communism, the mullahs and generals have done the same for Iran and Shiism.
Support is deepest in working-class and rural regions where religion is stronger than with urban middle classes. Reformists are seen as showing poor timing at the very least and helping foreign powers at the worst. After several rounds of harsh repression since the 2009 elections, the reform movement is at its weakest point since the Iraq war. Despair is setting in.
Next: reconciliation or revenge?
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.