Images of the Saudi future V – conflict and response

Brian M Downing

In coming decades Saudi Arabia could become more powerful than today. It already has considerable oil wealth and it may become an industrial power too as the crown prince diversifies his economy. Furthermore, he could transform the army into an effective professional forces which in conjunction with the armies of satellite countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan, could make the kingdom a major military power – and perhaps a worrisome one too. 

Given the intolerant, anti-western, and expansionist nature of Wahhabism, and decades of hostility toward Israel, Saudi rulers may turn against Israel. Direct warfare is unlikely. Israel can always rely on American support and the two powers could eliminate Arab air defenses in a matter of a few weeks, then devastate troop concentrations – reprises of 1967 and 1973. Arab armies know this but growing Saudi power and encouragement could minimize institutional memories.

Short of war, Saudi rulers would gain prestige and support from Arab populations simply by confronting Israel, endangering it, and demanding concessions. No war, no peace.

Economic sanctions 

As the kingdom’s economic development program proceeds, it may have a strong position in the region’s economy. Subsidies will be replaced by mutually-beneficial trade within a Middle Eastern common market. Israel would likely be an important part, providing technology and investments. 

Conflict would bring sanctions on Israel. Trade patterns would be interrupted, assets seized or at least endangered. The Saudis and their Sunni allies could work with the EU and other countries who want Israel to allow a Palestinian state. Russia presently works with Israel, but might one day be receptive to Saudi offers of more arms purchases in exchange for a break with Israel, including exporting its oil there.

Nuclear blackmail 

Saudi Arabia has announced plans for a nuclear program. It would likely be of limited potential but a breeder reactor capable of producing fissionable material could follow. International inspections will monitor reactors very closely but Riyadh could bar inspectors and move toward weapons development, as Israel did with its Dimona facility.

More likely, however, the Saudis could convince Pakistan to station some of its nuclear arsenal in the kingdom. It would be presented as a sign of mutual defense and an effort to guard holy sites, but Israel would find it intolerable. 

Peripheral and foreign attacks

Israel has endured attacks along its borders since its inception. Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt have all been home to guerrilla groups such as Fatah, Hisbollah, PFLP, Black September, and others that struck across their borders. Israel organized Unit 101 under Major Ariel Sharon to respond in kind. 

Today, borders with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria are relatively quiet. Only Lebanon is a source of regular attacks and even those have been reduced in recent years. However, a shift of Saudi priorities in coming years could lead to renewed attacks from all sides. There could be a return to the war of attrition that was waged between the ’67 and ’73 wars. Sunni powers could encourage and support Palestinian uprisings to impose more casualties and costs on Israel.

Recent years have seen a limited number of international attacks likely involving Israeli and Iranian intelligence units. The Sunni powers could support a return to the high levels in the 70s. But of course Israel has units capable of responding.

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The Saudi aims will be to confront and discomfort Israel, gain standing throughout the region, but fall short of provoking war. But of course the region’s history has many instances of miscalculations. Nasser sought to improve his standing in the Arab world by closing Israel’s access to the Red Sea in 1967 and Saddam did the same by going into Kuwait in 1991.

© 2019 Brian M Downing 

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.