Brian M Downing
Some wars ignite with little warning. The First Gulf War is a case in point. Others are seen from far off. Britain had long allied with Prussia/Germany but became wary as Germany became an industrial and naval power. Alliances shifted, war came. After that war, many diplomats and generals left the Versailles Conference convinced another great bloodletting loomed. After the US took the Philippines in 1898, Theodore Roosevelt thought war with Japan would come. Self-fulfilling prophecies were at work, but that’s the nature of wars, past and future.
In coming decades Saudi Arabia could be much more powerful than it is today, as Germany had by the late 19th century. The kingdom could be more ambitious too. Perhaps even more reckless. Iran may be gravely weakened by the US, Israel, and Sunni states, greatly enhancing the prestige of the kingdom and Mohammad bin Salman. The Sunni world may be more in tow than they are now, including states with disciplined armies such as Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan.
The Saudi industrialization effort could work out in a decade or so. The kingdom’s economy may comprise manufacturing, investment banking, and armaments. The effort would connect the Sunni world into a co-prosperity sphere with Riyadh at the center.
This will not sit well with Israel, any more than the rise of German industrial and military might did with Great Britain. Germany and Britain were longstanding allies who nonetheless fought two murderous wars against each other. Saudi Arabia and Israel have generally been enemies since the latter’s founding in 1948. Their recent alignment is of questionable provenance and doubtful longevity.
Saudi-Israeli cooperation against Iran may be a short break before a return to the status quo ante pacem. Washington and Jerusalem may be setting the stage for another Middle Eastern war, perhaps a jarring one.
Sources of conflict
The ideological underpinning of the kingdom and its rulers is Wahabbism – an austere Sunni sect historically hostile to the West, modernity, and Israel, and determined to spread itself throughout the Islamic world. Whatever the religiosity of the princes, they cannot ignore the creed’s principles or the expectations of true believers.
More broadly in the region, there’s a simmering yearning for restored unity and greatness. Once the center of the world, politically, militarily, culturally, and scientifically, the region has been defeated, occupied, and humiliated by a succession of outsiders. Islamic armies ultimately won the Crusades, but in modern times they lost to European, Israeli, and American forces – often swiftly and embarrassingly. Nasser and Qaddafi promised to restore unity and greatness, but failed. ISIL and al Qaeda’s vision of glory has only limited appeal. Mohammad bin Salman may offer a less murderous and more achievable vision.
Mohammad bin Salman’s legitimacy, at home and throughout the region, may one day rest in large part on defeating Iran. He will have brought victory to a region that’s seen very little of it. (The role of US and Israeli assistance will be minimized in Saudi narratives.) Faith and militarism will commingle and draw strength from one another. Publics across the region will want more – and look to Israel. An ambitious and ruthless king will not ignore them.
Leaders of most Sunni states, including Saudi Arabia, have looked the other way as Israel expanded its power over the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli leaders repeatedly hint at bolder action on the Temple Mount to their Orthodox and nationalist base. Arab publics have not forgotten these issues. Their clerics call attention to them, Al Jazeera covers them extensively.
Many of these sentiments may be especially strong in the armies in the Saudi sphere, especially those of Egypt and Jordan. They’ve been defeated by Israel on more than one occasion and lost territory as well. Calls for vengeance may commingle with those for proving faith and restoring past glory.
Saudi kings could increase their power prestige and standing with Arab publics and cast a shadow over Israel by developing nuclear weapons. Israel destroyed Iraqi reactors in 1981 and a Syrian one in 2007, and tries doggedly to expose Iranian weapons programs. It will never allow Saudi Arabia to become a nuclear power.
Riyadh may find a way to become a nuclear power with a move similar to one done in Cuba in the early 60s. The Saudis underwrote Pakistan’s nuclear program and continue generous subsidies to its army and religious establishment. The latter’s Deobandi creed closely parallels Wahhabism in its anti-western and anti-Israel passions. The Saudis could one day convince Pakistan to position nuclear weapons inside the kingdom. It could be presented as defending the homeland of Islam. After all, Pakistani troops have been there for decades. It would nonetheless be an effort to intimidate Israel and augment Saudi power prestige.
(Forthcoming analysis of the Saudi future: US-Israeli countermeasures to Saudi hostility and the potential for a momentous rise in Russian power throughout the Gulf.)
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.