Ideology and opposition in Putin’s Russia 

Brian M Downing

Putin’s war, now in its eighth week, continues to go badly for him. The army is suffering heavy casualties and confusion plagues the chain of command. Sanctions will bring depression by fall and the army may be paralyzed by morale, discipline, and supply problems before that. Many analysts think his grasp on power is weakening and strong popular opposition is coming soon.

Putin has blundered badly but not many of his subjects are likely to think that any time soon. We assimilate reports from the war one way, Russians assimilate the same reports, when they reach them, quite differently. 

We overestimate the strength of Russians who oppose Putin and the war, when they may be a small minority of educated, middle-class urban dwellers. More importantly, we underestimate popular support for Putin and the war. Traditional Russian outlooks and beliefs pervade the nation and shape opinion.

The outside world 

Russians view the outside world as ever-threatening. Calling this paranoia ignores centuries of invasion and suffering. Russians don’t do that. The Mongols devastated Russia in the thirteenth century, destroying its capital which, paradoxically, was then Kiev, and enslaving lands to the north, including Muscovy. 

Poland, during a time of weakness after Ivan IV’s death, conspired with disloyal aristocrats and wreaked havoc. Sweden inflicted great damage too, until it was defeated at Poltava (1714) – in Ukraine. Napoleon’s ill-starred campaign gave Russians lasting myths – and good music too.

The Third Reich’s attempted conquest is known as the Great Patriotic War. Over twenty million Russians perished, leaving memories of suffering and victory. Million of veterans and witnesses are alive to share recollections of the past and make comparisons to the present. 

Only a few years after Stalin’s armies defeated the Nazis, the West felt the need to counter Russia’s righteous might and iron determination. So was born NATO. At least, that’s the traditional Russian view.  

Moral strength

Invasions, traditional beliefs hold, have been repelled because of the nation’s unity and moral strength. Those virtues are enshrined in liturgy, rites, icons, and myths, and instilled through sermons and classroom teachings. Russians have a preternatural ability to endure suffering imposed by invaders and also by wise but harsh rulers who know best how to defend the realm.

The Third Rome ideology holds that Rome and Constantinople fell because of moral weaknesses. Russia is the successor to those mighty empires and it will never fall. Moscow’s strength is destined not only to preserve the nation but to save the world from degeneracy and evil.  

The Russian Orthodox Patriarch, alloying apocalyptic thought, military assessment, and praise for the prince, recently proclaimed his faithful were holding back the anti-Christ, presumably even on the corpse-strewn outskirts of Kiev.

The Ukraine war 

Events today resonate with traditional ideology, strengthening official positions and weakening critics, if not endangering them. NATO is the latest threat and the danger is now urgent. The Western alliance’s response to the “special operation” with sanctions, lethal weaponry, and likely expansion into Sweden and Finland make the threat all the clearer to traditionalists. Circularity abounds in nationalist ideology.

Significant opposition seems unlikely, at least in coming months. Most Russians are rallying to nationalist and martial exhortations, especially those resonant with WW2 myths. They accept official narratives of events and are willing to endure protracted hardships. Those who oppose the war are being fined, censured, arrested, and sometimes beaten. Poison might await the more irksome.  

Next: The prospect of opposition from oligarchs, generals, and state officials. 

©2022 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.