Brian M Downing
The Pentagon admits to about 2,000 troops in Syria, though it declines to give a precise number. The GIs range along the northern border with Turkey and extend down the eastern bank of the Euphrates. They serve as trainers, advisors, air support spotters, logistics personnel, artillery support, and medics. Though President Trump hinted at an impending withdrawal, key national security figures backtracked.
The troops are likely to remain for quite some time. A few decades isn’t out of the question. After all, deployments in the Balkans, Sinai, Afghanistan, Europe, and Korea have lasted that long. How did we wade into the Levant? What have the missions been and what might the present one become?
Training missions
Early in the Syrian conflict the US sat on the sidelines. Rebel forces were growing in numbers and support from Sunni states and the Muslim Brotherhood seemed sufficient to topple Assad. The Syrian army fell back from much of the country and tried to hold the line in the Shia west. Even that seemed destined to fall.
When Assad used chemical weapons, the Obama administration was about to intervene but it was taken in by Putin’s assurances that Syria would hand over its chemical arsenal. The war went on, rebel forces failed to form a united front, and Assad’s fortunes improved.
The administration felt the need to wade in, partly to uphold America’s position as leader in the world, partly out of humanitarian concerns. The US trained militias in the hope they would tilt the conflict in favor of the rebels. One group, the Free Syrian Army, was paid and armed with US help but never became a significant force. Another group, Division 30, organized by the CIA in Jordan, dissolved shortly after crossing into Syria. Its weapons surfaced on markets. The Free Syrian Army became a Turkish proxy.
Counterterrorism
Two of the more effective rebel groups were the al Nusrah Front, which was al Qaeda’s affiliate, and ISIL, which comprised the AQ affiliate in Iraq and parts of Saddam’s army. Their successes and atrocities led to another US effort – one that met with success.
Some nineteen Arab and Kurdish militias in the north and east have coalesced, for the time being, into the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). They have demonstrated their effectiveness against ISIL, taking back its capital of Raqqa. More recently, they have repulsed a probe by Russian mercenaries and another by a Syrian force that probably had Iranians in its ranks. The SDF, backed by American advisers and airpower, have established a de facto autonomous region along the Iraq border.
Foreign pressure
Pressure from Israel and Saudi Arabia to confront Iran has been strong for many years. The Obama administration, however, declined to strike Iranian nuclear sites and pursued diplomacy. The Trump administration is geared toward confrontation and has removed those who oppose it from key posts, Rex Tillerson and HR McMaster foremost among them.
US troops and their SDF militias will likely be tasked, at least unofficially, with interdicting lines of communication between Iran and its allies to the west. They may also seek to wear down Syrian and Iranian assets so as to prevent a reconstituted Syria, impose costs on Iran, and renew turmoil inside the Islamic Republic. Syria may become a theater where the US and its allies impose costs on Russia with the same hopes of bringing unrest at home.
An international Sunni force comprising Saudi, Egyptian, and Jordanian troops is in the works. This may lead to the Sunni and Kurdish autonomous regions becoming statelets, with recognition from the Sunni powers and the US. More ambitious planners may see them aligning with the Kurds of Iraq, perhaps one day even with those of Iran.
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International pressures are bringing considerable strategic vision to US foreign policy in the Middle East, which contrasts markedly with the ad hoc efforts of previous years. Slapdash as those efforts were, they have inadvertently handed opportunities to the neoconservatives, Likud, and Sunni princes. Nonetheless, this strategic vision, thoughtful as it is, might encamp the US in eastern Syria for many years if not decades, with little discernible benefit to our national security and with the prospect of many adverse consequences.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.