Brian M Downing
The situation in Iraq is worsening. The government is unpopular and struggling to form a coalition amid public unrest from militias, young people, and a burgeoning women’s movement. And the US and Iran are staring each other down there, at least when the issue comes to the president’s attention.
Recently, Hisbollah has increased its presence. It began shortly after the US invasion in 2003 when the Lebanese movement sent small numbers of fighters to support the Shia insurgency. Iran of course was behind the Hisbollah presence, then and now.
Iran and Hisbollah
The assassination of IRGC commander Soleimani angered the IRGC and increased its resolve to confront the US in Iraq and elsewhere, despite Rouhani’s wish to ease tensions. IRGC cadres will work with Hisbollah to make ragtag Shia militias better organized and more lethal and to work with oppositional ones such as those directed by the ever-opportunistic Moqtada al Sadr. The IRGC and Hisbollah built up Shia militias in Syria on short notice and they played important supporting roles in keeping the Shia-Alawi government in power.
Iran will benefit from a firmer presence against the US and Sunni groups and from more US floundering. It may also be bracing for the possibility of the Baghdad government’s collapse and all the hasty foreign reactions that would follow. Iraq might soon resemble Yemen or Libya and no one wants that on its borders. Better to form now a defensive glacis to the west – a direction that Sunni armies came in 1980, devastating the country and killing hundreds of thousands of Iranians.
Responses
The Baghdad government does not want increasing Iranian power. Nor does it want to see militias become more powerful. It’s already unclear if the national army would be able to take on Iran-backed militias, or even want to. In a year or so Baghdad could become a powerless capital, like Tripoli and Mogadishu.
Not all Shia militias are sympathetic toward Iran. Some will resent and oppose Hisbollah’s deepening presence, probably violently. Watch al Sadr. He has been in dialog with Saudi Arabia and not long after a parley with Mohammed bin Salman, his forces torched Iran’s consulate in Basra. Undoubtedly, Riyadh will be seeking closer working ties now but al Sadr is loyal only to himself – and deeply so.
There is no coherent policy in Washington. The president’s interests shift from day to day and the foreign policy team has too many empty roster slots. The Pentagon sees national priorities with Russia and China and wants to be rid of an endless, unwinnable conflict in a country with diminishing strategic interests.
Israel needs little impetus to launch more strikes on IRGC and Hisbollah positions in Syria, though it rarely acknowledges them. Netanyahu joked recently that a recent raid might have been done by Belgium. The IDF has demonstrated its ability to reach targets in Iraq – in recent months and in the 1981 Osirak raid.
Russia
The situation might seem to be a boon for Russia. Indeed, Baghdad is now open to a Russian training mission, presumably replacing the American one. Putin will be circumspect about deepening his position in Iraq, especially while in cahoots with Iran. Israel would be angry and Russia depends on it for high technology, oil and gas arrangements, and influence with Sunni powers. Netanyahu expects Putin to limit Iranian power. Gantz will too.
Russian help to Iran would also anger Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies. And Putin’s frail economy and boundless ambitions for global power keep his focus on the billion-dollar arms bonanza there. Iran and Hisbollah could become secondary.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.