Brian M Downing
The view here has long been that the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin’s private mercenary army, would cause trouble for Russia. Private armies and elite forces create tensions with the regular army, as with the Waffen SS and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. They may become too independent of the states they nominally serve, as with Wallenstein and the Habsburgs in the Thirty Years War. The emperor sent an assassin to terminate his command. Putin must wonder why he didn’t do so long ago.
Prigozhin has been vocal in criticizing the regular army for its lack of aggressiveness and inadequate logistical support to him. More recently, he stated that the Ukraine war was foisted on Vladimir Putin by scheming generals. After Russian airstrikes came down hard on his forces, Prigozhin has broken with army and state. He is taking control of the Rostov-on-Don region, calling upon regular army units to join him, and sending a column toward Moscow. He hopes to cause paralysis and consternation in army and state and lead a jarring uprising in the tradition of Stenka Razin, the Potemkin crew, and the Bolsheviks.
Rostov
Thus far the rebels have taken large parts of Rostov Oblast, just east of Ukraine. The region is important for logistical support to troops in Ukraine. Supplies to frontlines, especially on land bridge where Ukrainian troops are driving, will be diverted to support Prigozhin’s rebellion.
It’s unclear if the rebels have seized any nuclear weapons stored in Rostov. Possession without security codes might not mean the weapons can be used, but the threat of a nuclear Prigozhinistan would go a long way towards autonomy.
Rostov is close to restive Muslim parts of Russia, Chechnya and Dagestan. Prigozhin may incite uprisings with promises of autonomy. Chechen troops fight on both sides in Ukraine and Kadyrov’s pro-Russian militia is presently heading for Rostov to reassert Moscow’s control. They have not demonstrated anything near the military prowess of the Wagner Group. An unscrupulous mercenary himself, Kadyrov might entertain offers to switch sides, especially as his troops face heavy casualties.
Rostov is also near Azerbaijan and Georgia, former SSRs that oppose Putin’s effort to restore empire. They may support the rebels with spoiling attacks on Russian troops. If the rebellion gels, Ukrainian and Turkish diplomacy might come to bear, as might American.
Russia
The Wagner Group’s drive on Moscow is foolhardy. It diverts troops from the base area in Rostov. Recent reports indicate the drive on Moscow has ended, suggesting a modicum of canniness in Prigozhin.
The aspiring warlord should concentrate on appeals to the Russian people. He has already pointed out that the upper crust doesn’t serve in the war and that the working classes bear the brunt of hardships and casualties. More recently he stated that the generals led Putin into war with distorted intelligence and self-serving claims. Propaganda claims amid war and rebellion rarely come with footnotes.
Prigozhin could direct his claims of a poor man’s war to Asian populations. Their offspring have long served disproportionately in the Russian army, usually to escape hardscrabble lives in remote areas. They have been conscripted in greater numbers and suffered casualties the same.
Appeals to regular army troops will be essential. Claims of poor leadership will resonate with personal experiences. Some units are thought to have balked at orders or even come over to the rebels.
It doesn’t seem likely that Prigozhin can rally popular support or bring over significant parts of the army. If he has any future in Russia, it’s as the warlord of Prigozhinistan, not master of Russia. Alternately, he can flee Russia and establish himself and some of his forces in North Africa and the Middle East where he has thousands of troops, lucrative businesses, and malleable rulers.
Whatever the outcome, the Russian army has lost its most effective fighters and must pull regular troops from frontlines in Ukraine to fight the rebels, a process that could last months and further degrade the army. Demoralization and loss of confidence in leaders have undoubtedly worsened and may plague the military indefinitely. This of course presents tremendous opportunities for the ongoing Ukrainian offensive, especially around Bakhmut and the land bridge.
©2023 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.