Brian M Downing
It’s thought that Prigozhin’s rebellion damaged Putin and change may be coming in Moscow. Prigozhin certainly made Putin look foolhardy for supporting him so long, despite his sharp criticisms of the war and its generals. But Putin will only face serious trouble if one or more pillars of his rule go against him.
There’s no formal mechanism to challenge Putin. He’s seen to that. A Duma became openly critical of Nicholas II’s and pressed for Kerensky’s ascendance. His rule proved short-lived as the Bolsheviks seized power. The Soviet politburo tried unsuccessfully to oust Khrushchev in 1957 but succeeded seven years later. Cruder methods for deposing rulers abound in Russian history. Ivan the Terrible’s son was effectively replaced by his brother-in-law. Peter III was killed, probably at the behest of wife and successor, Catherine the Great. Her son and successor, Paul I, was soon enough murdered in a palace coup.
Putin’s Duma has voiced no challenge and there’s no politburo or party congress to lead the way. There may be other problems within elites brought on by a failing war and Prigozhin’s audacity but they do not seem substantial.
Security forces
Putin’s hold on power relies on popular support and harsh repression. Protest is limited to narrowly proscribed spheres and crushed outside them. Arrest and trial, street beatings, and murders are effective tools. There’s no sign security forces are less reluctant to use them to maintain order.
There’s no evidence of disaffection, refusal, or desertion in security troops. They are disciplined and remorseless believers in Putin and his mission of restoring national greatness and empire. They are prepared to come down harder after the Wagner rebellion.
The Duma
Weakened rulers risk trouble from elected assemblies, even previously docile ones. Defeat and debt led to the French Estates-General standing up to the Bourbons. A world war brought the Duma to do the same to the Romanovs. Yeltsin used his position in the meaningless Supreme Soviet to rally opposition to the attempt to depose Gorbachev. The junta fell apart – as did the Soviet Union.
The Duma of today has few voices of liberal democracy. That form of government was discredited in the dismal years after the Soviet Union collapsed. Nationalist and imperialist passions predominate, often in hateful, boastful ways. If opposition coalesces against Putin it will be as vengeful as Robespierre and as militaristic as Bonaparte.
The army
Opposition from any quarter would need a powerful leader and the army would be a source of one. Putin, however, has carefully selected his generals for their loyalty not professionalism, stolidness not charisma. He retained top generals not for their effectiveness but for the uncertainty around successors.
Paradoxically, Putin likely considered the Wagner Group a counterpoise to a military coup, as Hitler deemed the SS and the ayatollahs see the IRGC today. Loyal to Putin and not an institution, the mercenaries would defend him if tanks rolled into Red Square. Hence Putin’s toleration of Prigozhin’s tirades against the army and his reluctance to disband the Group. Putin may seek to remake it into a personal militia. He has dealt with his Röhm and must now find his Himmler.
Historically, coups are led by officers below the top. Colonels see their superiors’ incompetence and impact on promotions, professionalism, and effectiveness. Some officers might believe a few resolute battalions could take power. The Decembrists and Wagnerians came close, Lenin succeeded. But disaffected Russian officers today face far more sophisticated surveillance than Nasser and Qaddafi did before they ousted failing kings.
Officers might also fear that dethroning Putin would lead to dangerous instability as there is no institution or clique capable of governing the country. They know that Ivan the Terrible’s death led to a power struggle, foreign invasion, and civil war; and that the 1991 coup attempt brought down the Soviet Union, fragmented the empire from eastern Europe to Central Asia, and left the country rudderless and vulnerable.
Putin’s most serious army problem might not be colonels and generals, but privates and sergeants. They would not rise up en masse, but after years of casualties and defeats, they might refuse orders and bring the war and Putin’s ambitions to a halt.
The oligarchs
Authoritarian rulers, especially capricious ones, conflict with business leaders. The latter are interested in predictability and profits. Russian oligarchs have been hit by sanctions. Their products are banned in many countries and key supplies are hard to come by. They’ve lost their ability to travel abroad and have had personal assets seized.
Russian oligarchs differ from foreign counterparts. They were appointed by Putin, not shareholders or boards of directors. There may be significant ties though. The army collaborates with industries, often in secretive, corrupt ways. China too has important ties with the oligarchs and generals. It is concerned with Putin’s judgment.
Since the war began, over a dozen business leaders have met with unusual deaths. Whether they were guilty of disloyalty or merely thought capable of it, Putin is signaling ruthlessness, through probably needlessly. As much as Beijing might want a new leader in Moscow, it knows even suspected complicity in a putsch would trigger retribution that would set back its march to world power.
* * *
The impact of Prigozhin’s uprising on Putin might be less than thought. There’s almost certainly doubt in the helmsman but there’s also fear of him – and of internal chaos and foreign intervention that might follow his ouster. There’s no sign of appreciable opposition in the security bureaus, Duma, army, or oligarchy. Nor is there reason to expect it in the near future.
It’s impossible to know what’s going on in every office, corporate headquarters, staff meeting, and living room. Allied intelligence knew nothing of opposition to Hitler. Yet a coup attempt came close to killing him. Russian counterparts, if they exist, may be looking at Stauffenberg, but also at the costs of failure.
©2023 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.