Brian M Downing
The Arab Spring was so promising back in 2011. In Libya, Qaddafi was overthrown and killed by a coalition of popular militias. People power in the Maghreb. A representative government was sure to follow, once all those militias disbanded and their leaders formed a transitional government. Didn’t happen. Instead, the country was plagued by factionalism, tribalism, regionalism, and ISIL. It still is.
There are two main power centers. One in the west backed by the UN, another in the east backed by the Sunni powers and others. The forces in the east are led by Khalifa Haftar, a curious figure who has managed to be both a supporter and enemy of Qaddafi. His forces are now driving on Tripoli, the power center in the west.
What can Haftar accomplish and who’s supporting him?
The battle for Tripoli
Haftar’s forces have demonstrated considerable effectiveness in reducing ISIL’s presence and in taking control of oil fields and infrastructure in the northeast and south. He recently ordered his troops west to take Tripoli. His goal is to impose a single authority on all Libya.
His troops are more experienced and unified than the various militias defending Tripoli. However, the latter forces have the advantages of fighting from defensive positions and having access to airpower. Haftar’s columns are operating in open spaces with only limited air defenses. Further, Haftar’s campaign is bringing a measure of unity not seen since Qaddafi’s demise.
The Tripoli militias have the militarily-insignificant support of the UN. Haftar has at least some backing from France, Egypt, Russia, and the Sunni powers of the Gulf. Washington’s position remains unstated but is unlikely to deviate from Riyadh’s.
Haftar’s mission
The Sunni powers are likely pressing Haftar to become Libya’s new strongman. He will have several objectives.
ISIL and related groups are to be repressed. He has already expelled them from urban bastions along much of the coast. The concern is that ISIL can find safe havens with discontented tribes, especially nomadic ones in Libya and eastern Egypt. (France supports him for this reason. ISIL et al have established themselves in former French colonies to the south,)
The Tripoli government is reasonably representative in nature and this is a red flag to Saudi princes and Egyptian oligarchs. The Muslim Brotherhood, arch enemy of Saudi and Egyptian elites, cannot be allowed to become a force in Libyan politics. The Sunnis abroad are especially alarmed by the prospect of a stable democratic order using Libya’s oil wealth in a manner that would enhance democracy’s prospects in the Arab world.
Haftar will need little urging to try to impose himself as Libya’s new strongman. He can legitimize his rule, at least initially, as the man who crushed ISIL, ended lawlessness and paralysis, and imposed a stable basis for recovery.
In time, he could use the country’s formidable oil wealth to consolidate a Saudi-like rentier state, disbursing revenues to various peoples and tribes and consolidating order.
Viability
It’s difficult to see anyone effectively governing Libya but Haftar has an opportunity, though perhaps a fleeting one. He’s 76, travels to Europe for unspecified medical issues, and has made many enemies in the tribes and cities. Conquering the west will make more.
The country has never had a truly national government. Italy governed it as three distinct provinces, as did European powers after WW2 and the monarchy they later installed. Qaddafi ruled through personal power and local Revolutionary Councils which applauded the colonel’s decisions and divvied up spoils.
The most viable government will be one that delegates power to the three provinces and imposes a formula for sharing oil wealth. Libya is blessed with large oil resources and a small population. Indeed, Libya’s entire population is only one-third of Cairo’s. Systematic sharing of power and wealth could one day form the basis for a modicum of representative government.
Haftar may be able to accomplish something no one else presently can. He may also have the wiles to keep his country out of the control of both Saudi Arabia and the West.
©2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.