Brian M Downing
The Taliban, al Qaeda, and the rest
The Taliban government’s ties to al Qaeda and a slew of related jihadi groups in eastern areas are an embarrassment that threaten relations with the outside world, even China. A look into the ties will not be welcome in Pakistan either.
Cooperation goes back to the civil war of the nineties when the Taliban sought to subjugate the country following the Soviet withdrawal in 1988. Pakistan saw the Taliban as an ally against India and a power that could link Islamabad to promising commerce with Central Asia. Al Qaeda saw the Taliban as jihadi brethren. Taliban fighters, Pakistani troops, and al Qaeda fighters banded together.
The three groups have remained cooperative. Pakistan gave the Taliban safe havens and support and aided al Qaeda and other jihadi groups that strike Indian targets in Kashmir and sometimes India itself as with the 2008 Mumbai attack. The al Qaeda leadership operates inside Pakistan and has mysteriously evaded detection for twenty years and of course bin Laden was found living a stone’s throw from a Pakistani army base.
The Taliban victory was cheered south of the Durand Line. A Pakistani military delegation was among the first to meet with the Taliban in Kabul last month. Islamabad has a firm ally against India, access to commerce with the north, and greater security for its jihadi proxies.
The clearer the Taliban’s ties to al Qaeda and Pakistan’s proxies become, the greater the world’s reluctance to extend aid. China is willing to look the other way on human rights but not on jihadism. It’s concerned with militancy deepening in its Muslim regions. The Taliban have vowed to wipe out IS-K in their domain, but their al Qaeda colleagues and cohorts in eastern Afghanistan are of concern. They are aimed at India for now but can be lured into other causes.
Protracted fighting
In coming months the Taliban may face armed resistance, probably of low-intensity. Combatants would come from remnants of northern militias, tribes with longstanding enmity toward the Taliban, Hazara of central Afghanistan, urban women inspired by female Kurds, and former soldiers in the ANA.
The army never performed well, save for special forces units. That was not due to unwillingness to fight but to distrust of venal officers and unreliable supply systems. The widespread perception of unwillingness may motivate veterans to regain honor as guerrillas.
They have military training and some have contact with respected NCOs and junior officers. Many discarded their weapons but others only hid them. They all know how to get more from small bands of Taliban troops. Ambushes will likely lead to cruel reprisals but that will encourage greater opposition.
Low-level fighting in many cities and districts could stretch Taliban forces thin, as they did the ANA last summer. Some Taliban stalwarts may not take to going from expelling foreigners to killing locals. Dismay could lead to desertions and the loss of districts.
Resistance from Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazara may elicit sympathy in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran. Presently, only Tajikistan has shown considerable interest. The plight of Hazara concerns Iranian reformists but not the mullahs and generals who call the shots and look forward to the benefits of Chinese development in Afghanistan and Central Asia.
Protracted fighting will interfere with Beijing’s orderly extraction of material and indeed Chinese-owned mines and railroads may become prime targets.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.