Brian M Downing
In previous essays, warlords, women, humiliated former soldiers, and anti-Pashtun peoples have been identified as bases of opposition to the Taliban. At present, women seem to be the most insistent and they will become an international cause that will burden the Islamist militants. Other groups will announce themselves, peacefully or not, in coming months or years.
They will all face obstacles to coordination and fearsome repression. But they will soon pose serious problems for the Taliban – and for their partners in Beijing. The opposition wants to limit foreign aid to the Taliban, deepen conflict within its leadership, underscore ties to al Qaeda, inflict casualties, and build sympathy with neighboring countries. Most importantly, the opposition wants to convince China that the Taliban are not worthy business partners.
Limit Taliban resources
Though fresh from victory and feeling their oats, the Taliban know they failed to develop the country in the nineties. The results were insurgencies, resistance to taxation and conscription, and swift defeat once the US backed the Northern Resistance in 2001. The government needs money and the opposition wants to deny them it.
A startling 40% of Afghanistan’s GDP comes from foreign aid. That’s on hold now and the economy may collapse. The US has frozen some $9.5 billion of assets. Foreign powers are holding back from providing anything more than minimal aid until the Taliban demonstrate their rule is not nearly as reprehensible and oppressive as it was twenty years ago. Their disposition toward women is of considerable international concern, in government and the general public as well, and responses to urban protests are watched carefully.
Armed attacks by the opposition may lead to cruel reprisals and indeed may be calculated to do just that. No moderation, no foreign money – except from Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing who see Afghanistan as a bonanza. Only the latter has vast amounts of money. It also has immense investments already. However, the Afghan subsidiary is intended to play a role in China’s long march to global power and must not be a liability, political or economic.
Deepen elite conflict
The Taliban was unified by war and even then there were disputes within the shura and with military commanders. Mullah Omar had the personal authority to contain conflicts but he could not pass that on to successors, not during the war and not now when burdened with practical matters of governance and religion, economic development and foreign pressures.
The Taliban cabinet is clearly divided between hardline Wahhabists and more practical figures who see harshness as perhaps desirable but impractical given the changed society beneath them and the foreign restraints hovering over them.
Opposition, peaceful or not, will bring disagreement and conflict at the top. Should demonstrations be dispersed by firing into the air or into the crowd? If soldiers are ambushed, should nearby villagers be warned or just shot? Should officials follow their readings of the Koran and the Hadith or their understanding of how foreign countries will react? Will an iron fist bring pacification or escalation? The greater the opposition, the more likely the violent options.
The opposition will hope that the leadership becomes deeply divided, perhaps to the extent that purges, indecision, and paralysis follow. Factions may have to seek support from regional military commanders to settle matters. Faced with dispiriting factionalism and unsettling orders to crush any resistance, many fighters might desert. Beijing doesn’t want to see any of this in a business partner.
Next: links to al Qaeda, insurgency, and regional sympathy.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.