Brian M Downing
A powerful but uneasy alliance
At the outset of this century, Russia was still recovering from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The military and state were in disarray, the economy was struggling with the transition to private ownership, several SSRs had declared independence, and eastern buffer states were ousting Russian troops and welcoming NATO ones.
China was becoming an economic and military power but was not eager to regain lands annexed by tsars, though it could have done so given the state of the Russian army in the Far East. It was more concerned with consolidating economic and military power and building strategic alignments for its ascent.
Cooperation brought advantages. Russia benefited by selling more oil, military equipment, and technology to a growing power. Both wanted to challenge American power from the Baltic to the Yellow Sea and more recently in the Caribbean. The objective is to wear down the American public’s support for interventionism and military bases around the world.
Central Asia was on the back burner, save for Afghanistan where China bought resources and influence and Russia sent arms to the Taliban and parleyed with northern warlords.
Changes afoot
Looking back on the two states’ history, it’s difficult to see the partnership enduring, solid as it seems now. A glaring contradiction is between Russia’s desire to regain the power it had after WW2 and exact revenge on the US, and China’s mission to become the economic and political center of the world.
China’s power is far greater than it was twenty years ago. It’s wealthy, confident, even arrogant. Nothing, the Chinese state and public feel, can stop their restoration. Wrongs of the past can be righted – by economic clout, intimidation, or other means.
Russia has not kept economic or military pace. Putin certainly enjoys greater popular support than his predecessors did – the result of higher oil prices and assertiveness in the Ukraine and Middle East. Russian military power has expanded into bases in Syria and Libya but assets east of the Urals are neither well-equipped nor well-trained.
China is far less dependent on Russia for arms and technology than it once was. Its engineers and physicists have learned from Russian and American advancements, by hook or by crook, and incorporated the lessons into new programs. The J20 fighter, for example, is beginning to use engines designed and produced in China, rather than brought in from Russian plants.
China buys a great deal of oil from Russia but it’s developing fields in Xinjiang and offshore in the Gulf of Tonkin. It has strategically diversified its sources through deals with Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, other Central Asian states, and even the US.
In short, China does not need Russia as much as it did twenty years ago, and both powers know it.
Friction in Central Asia
The vast region from the Caucasus to Manchuria is being developed far more than the Soviet Union did, far more than Russia can afford to now. Though the former SSRs are independent now, Moscow sees them as part of its Near Abroad. The more China develops the region, the more it becomes theirs – and the greater the Kremlin’s concern.
Whatever the understanding is today, the two powers will face the contentious issues of who gets how much from the natural resources, who is providing security for the vast expanses, and who has more say with local leaders. Moscow will fear that former client states are becoming more loyal to Beijing. And Beijing may wonder if its immense investments might be appropriated into the Russian sphere, one way or the other, leaving Moscow with roads and mines to further develop and tax and fortify.
Chinese expansion into Central Asia will bring local resentments. Some will be Russian ethnic concurs, some will be Islamist militancy. The latter is all the more likely as Beijing is fueling the wrath of the Uighur in Xinjiang and their brethren across Central Asia. Some of them are already fighting in ISIL and AQ units in Afghanistan and the Levant.
Moscow has long feared the spread of radical Islam into its already restive Caucasus and other Muslim pockets and will be alarmed by its rise in the Near Abroad.
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.