Brian M Downing
An effort to transform a traditional, Islamist country into a modern one, in only a decade or so, using a large number of foreign troops and civilians, was bound to fail. Add in that the country was landlocked and surrounded by untrustworthy or hostile countries and the enterprise becomes absurd. It’s difficult to see how reasonably intelligent people could come up with such a plan.
It’s also difficult to see how the effort could go on for two decades, despite unmistakable signs of deep trouble. In 2010 I argued before a conclave of inter-agency officials that owing to Kabul’s corruption and Pakistan’s support to the insurgency, the Taliban would eventually take over the south. Better to withdraw from it and concentrate on the north and east. The idea didn’t get anywhere.
The Obama administration was determined that Afghanistan was a good war and could be won. The young, dynamic president would see to it. His administration tried a surge of US and allied troops and then counterinsurgency programs, but the Taliban continued to win support. Generals came and went.
By 2012 it was clear the war was futile and the administration should’ve recognized it. Key figures probably did but didn’t want to admit it. Better to continue the war and hope for the best. Something was sure to turn up. Ignore the signs.
Pakistan
One of the earliest failures was comprehending Pakistan’s support for the Taliban. That had been the case since the early 90s when the generals saw the former mujahideen band as an ally that could expand their influence in Afghanistan and tap into the promising Central Asian region. Power and riches were theirs.
9/11 changed many things but not Pakistan’s support to the Taliban.The generals assured Washington they would help but persisted in providing the Taliban with money, arms, and safe havens. Taliban leaders directed the war from Quetta and Peshawar, mysteriously eluding Pakistani authorities for two decades. Keep it up, the Pakistani generals counseled, the Americans will tire just as the Russians did. Power and riches will be ours.
All the while we were conferring with Pakistani generals and giving them billions in aid. Any effort to get them to end their aid and eliminate safe havens would lead to the closing down supply lines into Afghanistan. They had us trapped and everyone knew it.
Corruption
Ten years on, the venality of the Afghan government, from the presidential palace to provincial and district chiefs, was appallingly clear. Schools were funded but never completed. The same held for irrigation systems, medical and veterinary clinics, roads and bridges, and so on and so on. A watchdog group (SIGAR) reported the enormity in detail. Its newsletter could be easily mistaken for screeds from an antiwar group but SIGAR was part of the US Defense Department.
The Pashtun government replaced many competent Tajik generals, including those who had driven the Taliban out, with fellow Pashtuns. The new officers had neither professional competence nor the trust of the rank and file. An army so poorly organized would never stand up.
Confident that Washington had too much invested, Kabul rebuffed pressure to reform. Army and state remained corrupt and incompetent, right up to mid-August. Over the years local Taliban officials met with village elders and clan chiefs and played up Kabul’s corruption. The Taliban were making progress in hundreds of districts without firing a shot. Pentagon maps showed steady losses.
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Counterinsurgency doctrine holds that governments must not be corrupt and insurgents must not have safe havens. By 2012 it was clear Kabul was irremediably corrupt and Pakistani safe havens were inviolable. There was also early intelligence stating that Iran and Russia were aiding the Taliban, in part to bleed the US, in part to establish influence with a group that seemed sure to govern at least a good deal of Afghanistan.
Signs of impending failure were clear but few in the White House, Pentagon, CIA, or State dared speak up. Our generals knew what they were doing. Our young president would find a way. Better to hold back and hope something turned up. The casualties weren’t that high.
© 2021 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.