Brian M Downing
The US left Iraq in 2011 but returned at the invitation of the government. Initially, and relatively secretly, the US sent counterterrorism teams when al Qaeda resurfaced shortly after the US left. A fuller deployment came when ISIL overran the north. ISIL has lost almost all its territory but has reconstituted itself as an underground guerrilla force with at least some support from embittered Sunnis.
A second problem has surfaced. Shia militias, some backed by Iran, are firing mortar and rockets onto US positions. Sometimes the rounds hit near the embassy in the heavily defended Green Zone. The US responds with airstrikes and targeted killings. The latest volley between the two sides took place in the last 24 hours. More are likely to follow.
Where is this going?
The exchanges can go on indefinitely. The militias have the capacity to obtain and launch rockets and the US has almost unlimited weapons at its disposal. Neither side can wear the other down and cause it to throw in the towel. If either side is gaining from the fighting, it isn’t the US, as shall are seen.
If the US cannot silence the militias, it will be tempted to escalate. This could be done by striking supply hubs inside Iran, high-value Iranian targets, or IRGC naval vessels in the Gulf. Iran can escalate as well. It can return to attacking international shipping and increase the quantity and quality of weaponry sent to militias.
The exchanges are increasing anti-US sentiment in Iraq and the region. This is especially the case as the US strikes are conducted without the approval of the lawful government. If exchanges continue, the perception will grow that the US presence is becoming permanent.
By taking on the US, the Shia militias are gaining support and legitimacy. Ragtag militias are seen as acting in the national interest against a detested power whose presence they feel is no longer needed. Sunni bands may get involved. They may find international support.
The popularity and prestige of militias are growing and respect for the Baghdad government is dwindling. Negotiations to form a viable coalition have thus far failed and the state is in danger of collapse or at least irrelevance. Falling oil prices are not helping. David Kilcullen’s dictum has been noted here before: militias do not rise to power when the state collapses; the state collapses when militias rise to power. Iraq is headed that way.
It’s increasingly clear that ISIL will retain its underground presence in Iraq for decades, if not generations. The region has a large, disaffected youth cohort, jihadi ideology or at least aspirations of martial glory are common, and the governments are unpopular. What more do we have to gain by staying in Iraq?
© 2020 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.