Brian M Downing
Amid the battles and atrocities of the Syrian civil war have been scores of Israeli airstrikes on Syrian, Iranian, and Hisbollah positions. The strikes picked up in February when an Iranian drone crossed into Israeli airspace and the IDF retaliated on Syrian air defenses. This week Iran fired twenty missiles into Golan and the IDF struck fifty Iranian sites.
More exchanges are coming and Iran will not fare well. The view here has long been that Iran cannot match Israel in Syria and that it’s ensnarled in a trap that could destabilize the Islamic Republic. The fervor of the mullahs and the obstinance of the generals are seeing to it. Iran cannot back down without losing face, and cannot stand up without losing a lot more.
Airpower
Iran has no fixed-wing aircraft in Syria. Israel has a powerful air force that has struck inside Syria ever since 2007 when it destroyed a suspected nuclear site. (It can also strike Iran itself.) Syrian air defenses have had almost no success against Israeli aircraft, downing only one fighter last February when a pilot failed to take adequate precautions. Israeli strikes since last February have crippled Syrian defenses.
Few on either side will forget the air duels over the region in 1982. Syria lost over eighty aircraft; Israel lost none. Technology has advanced since then, on both sides, but Israel’s equipment and pilots almost certainly retain a daunting advantage. It has yet to use its most advanced fighter, the F-35.
Options
Iran has no air defenses in Syria, save perhaps for some MANPADs that have yet to announce themselves. It may want to set up SAMs but deployment will be difficult and Israel will almost certainly destroy them before they’re operational. Whatever Iran constructs – troop encampments, logistical hubs, radar sites – will be destroyed.
More missiles could be fired from Syria but Israel has air defenses that can intercept almost anything, from intermediate-range missiles to crude projectiles assembled in Gaza cellars. Firing missiles from Iran will lead to disproportionate retaliation, perhaps from Israel and the US.
Hisbollah has thousands of missiles which if fired in swarms could hit Israeli cities. However, as long as Israel strikes targets in Syria and not in Lebanon, as it has thus far, Hisbollah will want to avoid the devastation Israel wreaked in 2006. Still, miscalculations occur in every conflict.
Send troops toward the Israeli border? Iran has a few thousand IRGC soldiers in Syria and tens of thousands of allied militia troops recruited from several Shia countries. Israel would welcome so foolhardy a move. Shia casualties would be high, Israel’s negligible. IRGC troops may remain steadfast after repeated airstrikes but their heterogeneous Shia allies might not fare so well. They may in fact disintegrate and shift the burden of war even more onto the IRGC.
Tehran could resort to assassinations and bombings in the region and elsewhere. Mossad can best the IRGC in this regard. Further, terrorism would turn the EU and other parts of the world against Iran.
Concerns
Iran probably increased its presence in Syria over the last few years confident of Russian support. Putin’s silence in recent weeks must be deafening and worrisome. Where are the vaunted Russian air defenses? Russia’s most advanced system, the S-400, operates in northwestern Syria, manned by Russians, not Syrians. The system thus far has switched on only briefly. No Israeli aircraft have been targeted. Putin appears to allow Israeli strikes on Syrian, Iranian, and Hisbollah sites in order to maintain good relations with Israel. Iran must wonder if Israeli and Saudi diplomacy could further weaken Russian support.
The conflict has the added benefit of sowing mistrust between Moscow and allies in Damascus and Tehran. Meanwhile, Syrian and Iranian resources are being whittled down in the Levant with almost no cost to Israel.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.