Donald Trump takes on Saudi Arabia – and foreign policy
Brian M Downing
Throughout the presidential campaign Donald Trump has spoken freely and often harshly of many individuals and groups. He recently bluntly noted Saudi Arabia’s AWOL status in the ISIL War, even though it takes place not far from the Kingdom’s northern borders. There have been brief skirmishes between ISIL fighters and Saudi border patrols.
Yet the Saudis have done very little. In mid-February Riyadh deployed a handful of fighter aircraft to Turkey. The number of sorties has been less than impressive. The US continues to shoulder most of the burden of the air war against ISIL.
Trump has proposed cutting US oil imports from Saudi Arabia until they assume a greater role in the war. The words were placed on a long list of intemperate remarks made by the real estate titan, and generally ignored. Trump’s argument has its attractions. Saudi Arabia’s power relationship with the US is not what it was in the days of the ’73 oil boycott. Implementation, however, would not be without problems.
Saudi-American power relations
At the close of World War Two, President Roosevelt met with Saudi monarch. The US established a protectorate of sorts over the Kingdom, and in return Saudi oil was tied to American interests. This was more than just business. The US worried that the war had 
depleted its oil reserves and wanted foreign assets to be tapped as Europe rebuilt.
By the early seventies, the US was importing immense quantities of oil from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. It weakened US foreign policy and led to the Nixon administration’s encouraging those countries to buy US weapons in order to ease the trade deficit.
American, Mexican, and Canadian production has greatly reduced US dependency on Saudi oil. Riyadh’s influence in Washington is no longer based on oil; it’s based on broader security issues in the Middle East and on Saudi arms purchases.
Saudi Arabia is more vulnerable to the GOP frontrunner’s threat than he may know. It’s well known to every driver that oil prices have dropped sharply, but there are other considerations. The Kingdom, in conjunction with Royal Dutch Shell, owns three refineries on the US Gulf coast and thousands of retail gas stations. (The largest refinery will soon be completely in Saudi hands.) A determined president could force Saudi divestment, and when combined with slashed imports, Saudi revenue will be critically reduced.
The Saudi military
In principle, pressuring the Saudis into the ISIL War is attractive. It is their backyard; ISIL fighters are followers of the Saudi Wahhabist creed; some 5000 Saudis serve with ISIL and AQ, and ISIL coffers receive money from the Kingdom’s subjects.
But what would Saudi troops in combat lead to? Deployments into Syria or Iraq would lead to a reaction from Shia Iran. The IRGC would almost certainly counter, if not with its own troops then with Shia militias it trains and pays.
Sectarian hatreds are at their highest in centuries and missteps will make the far worse. But putting that aside for a moment, would the well-appointed Saudi army perform well? As a character in The Dirty Dozen says, “Very pretty, but can they fight?”
Saudi Arabia is the third largest arms purchaser in the world. This guarantees it considerable influence in exporting nations, but it has not guaranteed a competent military. Its army is plagued by the same problems of nepotism, corruption, and tribal antagonisms that have led to unimpressive showings by the Syrian army and disastrous ones by the Iraqi army.
These problems are plain, another one isn’t. The Kingdom’s austere religious creed parallels jihadi ideology. Indeed, jihadism is simply a more militant form of Wahhabism. A substantial number of Saudi troops may be attracted to service with ISIL, especially if they see the royal family’s incompetent relatives and friends in charge of battalions and brigades, and western trainers around them and western planes above them. ISIL has attracted many former members of Saddam’s army. It may be able to do the same with King Salman’s.
The region’s armies are plagued by corruption and nepotism and failed leadership. Paradoxically, the most effective army the region has produced in recent memory is that of ISIL.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.