Donald Trump goes deeper into the Middle East

Brian M Downing 

Candidate Trump promised a more aggressive fight with ISIL and a return to military victories. He has not thus far disappointed supporters of tougher stances in world affairs.

In the last month, a few hundred marines took up positions around ISIL’s Syrian capital of Reqqa, an unspecified number of the 82nd Airborne deployed to Mosul, and some 2500 troops have landed in Kuwait to support operations in Syria and Iraq. The Pentagon is weighing a greater role in Yemen. The US may go beyond counterterrorism operations against ISIL and al Qaeda, and increase support to the Saudis and their Sunni allies.

The previous president gradually increased troop deployments into the Islamic world and also their proximity to combat. The new president is continuing the process, though unlike his predecessor, Trump may have to face the consequences of deeper involvement.

Escalation

The most obvious concern is that the wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen will not proceed as favorably as the president expects. In the business world, adding personnel and money goes a long way. Not so in foreign policy.

ISIL troops are resourceful and highly determined. They have already forced the best Iraqi units to step back  and recover from casualties and exhaustion. The same could happen in Reqqa. The president may believe that only a few thousand more troops will be decisive, especially if they are backed by more helicopters and planes and artillery.

Deployment of one or more full divisions (18000-36000 personnel) into the region, and taking on large-scale ground operations, is not likely. The Pentagon isn’t as accepting of such campaigns as it was following the 9/11 attacks. The generals have also seen polling data that show considerable wariness in the rank and file regarding long deployments. The generals may also better recognize impending problems in the region.

Shia versus Sunni 

Sectarian animosities have reached levels not seen in centuries. The American invasion of Iraq and the Syrian civil war have seen to that. US forces are contributing to the war on ISIL but upon the fall of Mosul and Reqqa, the they will be in the middle of sharp conflicts over religion.

The Sunnis of northern Iraq will welcome the defeat of ISIL, but not the return of the Shia government in Baghdad. Similarly, central and eastern Syria are Sunni and will not welcome the return of the Alawi-Shia government in Damascus. The Sunnis of both Syria and Iraq will try to draw the US into their sectarian fights.

Territorial unity versus regional autonomy

The Middle East is breaking up, especially the three countries the president is eyeing. In Iraq and Syria, Kurdish fighters have inflicted punishing defeats on the seemingly invincible ISIL forces, and continue to wear them down today.

Sunni militias too have played roles. In Iraq, they hold onto pockets in Anbar province and form blocking positions near Mosul. To the west in Syria, they are sizable parts of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces besieging Reqqa.

The Kurds and Sunnis want autonomy if not independence from Shia-Arab rulers. They’ve been armed and trained by the US, they’ve served alongside US troops. The’ve advanced US interests, they expect the US to advance theirs.

The war in Yemen pits a Shia north against a Sunni south. Though complicated by backers in Iran and Saudi Arabia, the conflict is essentially a third civil war between north and south. Greater support for the Sunni south ensnarls the US in a sectarian and regional conflict, when a diplomatic solution involving partition might be the wiser option.

Reform versus old regimes

The breakdown of many countries in the region stems from their governments’ refusal to adapt to a changing world. The failure of their armies to perform well in wars, recent and going back at least to 1967, stems from the same problem. Army and state are corrupt, authoritarian, and incompetent.

Neither the popular protests of the last few years, nor the startling offensives of Islamist forces, has brought reform, as it did, say, in Prussia, Britain, and post-Ottoman Turkey after their armies fared poorly. in wars.

Middle Eastern rulers have avoided substantive reform. In Iraq, even after ISIL had taken cities within reach of Baghdad, legislatures blocked reform in army and state.

Middle-Eastern potentates have done well in convincing foreign armies to defend them and fight their proxy wars. The US and Britain, Pakistan and Turkey, are doing far more than all the armies of the oil-rich countries. Even Colombia has been convinced to send mercenaries to Yemen.

The more the US does in the region, the less incentive the potentates have to build popular support and professionalize their armies. Further, the more convincing is jihadi propaganda that says local rulers are corrupt oligarchs who maintain their hold on power only through western intervention.

Copyright 2017 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.