Context and outcomes of the Saudi-Iranian crisis 

Brian M Downing 

The Houthis claim of responsibility for the attacks on Saudi oil assets is in doubt. The distance, directionality, and complexity of the strike, which included sophisticated cruise missiles, point away from the fierce but technically-limited Yemeni movement. Washington and Riyadh are predictably blaming Tehran but other capitals are calling for calm and more information. 

Regional context

The strikes weren’t unexpected. They came after decades of tension beginning with the breakdown of the US “twin pillars” policy which was based on Washington’s good relations with Riyadh and Tehran. This of course ended with the Khomeini Revolution in 1979 and the Sunni invasion of Iran the following year. Over a million people died in the next eight years. 

More recently there’ve been terrorist attacks inside Iran conducted by Kurdish, Arab, and Baloch separatists and by the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK). All four groups have almost certainly had support from Saudi Arabia and Israel. Iran for its part has assassinated Arab and MEK leaders in Europe and tried to kill Israeli diplomats. 

Saudi Arabia is attempting to control Yemen but the Shia north, with Iran’s help, has thus far thwarted it. The crown prince has courted a major Iraqi Shia leader, Moqtada al Sadr. Shortly later, Sadr’s militias torched the Iranian consulate in Basra. 

The Syrian civil war began as a popular protest against the Assad government but devolved into a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The latter’s side has prevailed but the country is in ruins, leaving Iran surrounded by hostile Sunni powers without a significant regional ally.

In the last two years the US has reimposed sanctions on Iran despite no evidence that it had breached the JCPOA. Since then, Iran has seized several tankers and probably attached explosives to others.

Retaliation  

Israel make strike Iranian and Hisbollah targets in Syria and Lebanon with little if any consultation. Though PM Netanyahu’s political future is uncertain after this week’s election, he may want to damage Iran as much as possible before leaving office and not entrust a national security matter to his likely successor, a retired army chief of staff.

American policy toward Iran has been on hold ever since the president retracted a strike order last summer. Hawkish advisor John Bolton has been shown the door but Sec of State Pompeo and son-in-law Kushner are firmly in the Persia delenda est camp. Strikes on Iranian oil assets and/or IRGC sites may be forthcoming.

The administration must assess the escalation ladder. Iran will not act like a chastened student. It will strike back. If it did indeed execute last weekend’s strike on Saudi oil sites, it has considerable levels of drone and missile technology and the tactical skill to direct long-range strikes that avoid detection.

It will be interesting to see how Saudi and US air defenses fared during last week’s strike but at present American ships and bases in the Gulf must be on edge. A swarm of Iranian drones and missiles could overwhelm a battle group’s defenses and set an aircraft carrier ablaze. The shock to the American public would be immense, the president’s response wrathful. 

Negotiation 

The absence of a US response is encouraging. The president may have been taken aback by the escalation ladder, and may see his presidency being drawn into war by strategically lesser countries and personally repugnant leaders. 

There is no support for retaliation in the EU, South Asia, and East Asia. And Riyadh might face concerted opposition form Gulf states such as Qatar and Oman which do to want to see war in the Gulf. Even the UAE is at odds with the Saudi princes over Yemen. Countries in Europe, the Gulf, and Asia may call for restraint and negotiations.

If the US opposes dialog, Russia and China may step in. Russia has good trade relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. China buys formidable amounts of crude from them. Moscow and Beijing might act with several longstanding American allies to cool things off. 

The view here has long been that Russia and China want to supplant the US in the Gulf and become the hegemonic powers there. Missteps by the US may help them take a big step toward that end.

© 2019 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.