Cold War Two flash points from Syria to Afghanistan
Brian M Downing
Both the US and Russia have deepened their involvement in the chaotic Islamic world. The US, after withdrawing its troops from Iraq in late 2011, has gradually reinserted some 5000 troops, including artillery units. Advisers serve with Kurdish and Arab units in Syria. And the withdrawal from Afghanistan has been halted.
Russia, incensed after NATO operations against Libya helped bring down an ally, has sent fighter aircraft and a sophisticated air defense system to Syria, and built up a sizable airbase at Latakia. It already had a naval base at Tartus. Ties with Iran have been strengthened by providing the same air defense system and flying sorties over Syria from an Iranian airfield.
These moves come at a time of worsening relations between the two powers. This presents the possibility of greater tensions, even clashes, in several places.
Turkey
Only a few months ago, sharp conflict between Turkey and Russia looked likely, especially after the former downed a Russian jet. Retaliation seemed in the offing. As Turkey is a NATO member, this presented risks of a larger conflict – or a weakening of the old alliance.
More recently tensions have eased. Each side recognizes the importance of longstanding economic relations. Each sees benefit in calming the Syrian wars and concentrating on ISIL. And each side sees benefits in causing trouble for the West, especially the US. The region is volatile, but short-term at least, Turkey does not pose a source of US-Russian conflict.
Syrian Kurdistan
Only a few months ago, Syrian Kurds and their putative government in Damascus had a modus vivendi. The Kurds established autonomous regions far from the government’s writ and were the most effective enemies of ISIL. Russian aircraft even began running airstrikes for them.
Regional volatility has been mentioned. Government troops and Kurdish militias have started fighting for Aleppo, and three days ago Syrian jets bombed Kurdish positions well to the city’s east where US special forces are engaged in training missions. The government knew this and the government almost assuredly had Russian approval. The US scrambled fighters to chase away the Syrian jets but they returned the following day, assuredly with Russian approval.
If they return once more the US will feel obliged to support its quasi-protégés, and Russia will feel the same about its ally. This raises the possibility of US-Russian aerial engagements. The superiority of US pilots, aircraft, and weaponry is clear. How Moscow would respond to embarrassing losses is not.
The battle for Raqqa
ISIL took the eastern Syrian city in 2013 and made it their capital shortly thereafter. Retaking it would weaken ISIL’s claim to being a new state, but who will do it? Two forces will be vying: the Syrian Democratic Forces, an amalgam of Kurdish and Arab troops backed by the US; and the Syrian army, which is backed by Russian airpower and Iranian ground troops. The SDF has just taken the ISIL town of Manbij and is preparing to move on Raqqa from the north. The Syrian army retook Palmyra last spring and will drive from the south.
The two-prong campaign presents problems for ISIL’s limited numbers but also presents problems for attacking forces. The attack can proceed with little cooperation between the SDF and government forces, though only in preliminary stages. As both sides near Raqqa, there’s potential for errant bombing missions and ground skirmishes. And which side will hoist its flag over the city and which side gets the consolation prize of the surrounding desert wasteland? The battle is likely to turn into a battle between the SDF and the government, and to some extent between foreign backers.
The battle for Mosul
Similar dynamics are unfolding for ISIL’s major holding in Iraq. Most attacking forces are supported by the US: Kurdish militias from the north, Iraqi special forces from the south. Shia militia tied to Iran, though led by the self-promoting Moqtada al Sadr, play supportive roles in the south.
Russia has offered air support in the campaign in northern Iraq but thus far received no positive response. Moscow is clearly interested in Iraq.
Ousting ISIL will bring grievous problems – and opportunities for Russia and Iran. The indigenous Sunni population will not welcome the Kurdish and Shia troops as liberators. They represent forces determined to steal land and reimpose sectarian domination. Shia militias, aligned with though not obeisant to Iran, will seek to impose their own administration, as they have in Ramadi.
One form of conflict will replace another. Russia and Iran have little to gain here, as the Shia militias will seek to maximize al Sadr’s power, not foreign influence. The goal may be to cause trouble for American efforts.
Afghanistan
At least there is one place where American and Russian interests coincide: halting the spread of Islamist militancy in Central Asia. Russia has far more to lose. Should the Taliban return to power, they would encourage the spread of Islamist extremism, by inspiration or overt support, into the former Soviet Republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, which Moscow deems its client states. Militancy could even spread into Muslim parts of Russia. Such is the mistrust in Moscow that it is believed the US is encouraging the spread of Islamist militancy into the Russian sphere.
Nonetheless, cooperation goes on. Russia is critical to American logistics for the Afghan war. US supplies unload in the Latvian port of Riga then are shipped by rail across Russia and Uzbekistan, before entering Afghanistan. Though common interests will likely prevail, Moscow could close down the northern route, at least temporarily, to express displeasure with US policies elsewhere.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.