Brian M Downing
European militaries were once led mainly by aristocrats. Owning an estate bestowed the privilege of leading regiments and armies. The middle-classes were only sparsely found; navies were more welcoming to them. The Napoleonic conflicts and a few decades later the Crimean War showed deep problems with aristocratic preeminence in many European states but Russia continued the practice, until the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917.
Bolshevik leaders of course had to open up the officer corps because the nobility loathed them and fought against them in the civil war. Former peasants and laborers became colonels and more. Stalin, fearful of a rival power center, purged the generals just before World War Two and replaced them with officers he deemed loyal to him. Expertise was less important. The ensuing war was probably more costly than it would’ve been without the purges and promotions.
The practice is in place today. Putin promotes those who support or please him. This places Russia alongside smaller dictatorships in the Middle East where the main purpose of armies is keeping subjects in line and remaining loyal to the boss. After all, most rulers in the region came to power through military force and they’re eager to avoid being overthrown. An autocratic imperative prevails. Armies remain undemocratic, unprofessional, and incompetent. Calls for professional standards occasionally come, say, after poor performance in war, but the autocratic imperative reasserts itself. Protect the ruler.
Putin’s generals might be better than those of Nasser, Saddam Hussein, and Bashir Assad, but their sub-optimal qualifications pervade and corrode the army. Colonels and majors see the criteria and what it takes to continue up the ranks. Every branch of the service, every regiment and battalion, every major on up, is less than efficient. Troops come to recognize it, all the more clearly when the shooting starts.
Armies like that can get by for years. Garrisons look orderly, salutes are crisp, maneuvers go well, and Red Square parades impress perhaps even awe. But things don’t work out when sent into the fray, especially if going against a motivated, disciplined enemy. Planning, maneuvering, ground-air coordination, maintenance of sophisticated equipment, logistics, and communication with other units suffer.
Russian airborne troops are a case in point. They put on great shows of determination and athleticism for YouTube but such displays of virile bravado have little to do with combat effectiveness, and the vaunted paratroopers showed their heels around Kharkiv. That’s on YouTube too.
The army’s performance is low, casualties high. Ire from above will be intense, retribution swift.
©2022 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to fellow Hoya Susan Ganosellis.